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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
A. Ross's Significance 
The major concern of this thesis will be a detailed examination of 
the main problems that are encountered in W. D. Ross's ethical theory. 
11'. D. Ross is a contemporary British philosopher who has distinguished 
himself in two philosophical areas. He is on the one hand a leading 
Aristotelian scholar. And on the other hand he has, in the thinking of 
m~, produced two of the ten most influential and important books in 
ethical theor.y since the turn of the century. He is a leading critic of 
utilitarianism and perhaps the foremost exponent of formalism in the 
twentieth century. 
B. Sources tor This Study 
Ross•s ethical theory is contained in the two volumes, The Right and 
the Good and Foundations of Ethics, which first appeared in 1930 and 1939 
respectively.l The contents of the latter volume were delivered at the 
University of Aberdeen as the Gifford Lectures for 1935-36. Besides these 
two volumes a tew articles by Ross on aspects of ethical theory appeared 
lThe Right and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930). Foundations 
of Ethics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939). 
2. 
in British journals between 1929-31.2 Since the Foundations of Ethics 
no writing in ethical theor,y by Ross has appeared in published form.J 
The major sources of information, then, for Ross's ethical theory are 
the two volumes, The Right and the Good and Foundations of Ethics. 
c. The Plan of the Work 
In this work, ethical theories will be classified under the two 
main headings of critical ethics and normative ethics, the former being 
concerned with the meaning and justification of ethical statements and 
the latter with determining what things are right or good or both. 
Before Ross's critical and normative ethics are discussed, his 
methodology will be examined in detail. Chapter II constitutes a study 
of Ross's methodology. Once clear on Ross's method of approach to the 
study of ethics, the way is open for a study of the more fundamental 
problems encountered in his ethical theory. 
In terms of critical ethics Ross is classified as a nonnaturalist 
or intuitionist. In chapter III Ross's critical ethics will be examined. 
After placing the problem of Ross's critical ethics in its philosophical 
context, we shall study his theories (1) of the intuitive knowledge of 
ethical facts and (2) of the indefinability of ethical terms. 
In terms of normative ethics Ross is classified as a formalist. 
Chapter IV constitutes a study of Ross's normative ethics. Here Ross's 
2"The Nature of Morally Good Aotion,• Proceedings of the Aristotelian 
Society, XXIX~ (1928-29) 1 251•74. "The Ethics of PuniShment," Journal of 
Phiioso\hical Studies, IV (1929), 205-11. H. D. Paton, w. D. Ross, and 
J. t. S ocks, Hsymposiumt The Coherence Theory of Goodmess 1 " Proceedings 
of the Aristotelian Societz, SUpplementary Vol. 10 (1931), 52:SO. 
3A study by Ross of Kant's ethical theory appeared in 1954. However, 
this adds nothing to Ross's own ethical theory. w. D. Ross, Kant's Ethical 
Theo • A Comments on the Grundle ung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (oi?ord: 
aren on ess, • 
.3 
theories about duties, goods, and moral goodness will be considered. Also 
contained in this chapter will be an attempt to draw out the implicit 
value structure contained in Roasts theory; an architectonic of values as 
envisioned by Ross will be exhibited. 
One other major problem emerges in Ross's ethical theory. This is 
the problem of Free-will vs. Determinism. Ross, although not completely 
satisfied with his solution of this problem, takes a deterministic stance. 
Ross believes in the universal reign of the law of causation, while at the 
same time maintaining that individuals are responsible moral beings. 
Ross's theory in this regard will be examined in chapter v. Also considered 
there will be the question whether a necessary presupposition of moral 
freedom is contra-causal freedom. 
II. 
ROSS t S METHOOOLOGY 
A. The Critical Study of the Moral Consciousness 
There are several different methods of approach to a study of ethics.l 
The approach of Ross is that of the critical study of the moral conscious-
ness. Says Ross, 
I propose to take as my starting-poiQ~ the existence of what is common-
ly called the moral consciousness; and by this I mean the existence of 
a large body of beliefs and convictions to the effect that there are 
certain kinds or acts that ought to be done and certain kinds of things 
that ought to b~ brought into existence, as far· as we can bring them 
into existence. 
This, or course, is not to say that all these convictions are either true 
or consistent or clear. The philosopher must study and compare these con-
victions, rejecting those which are ill-grounded or which contradict other 
convictions better grounded, and clearing up ambiguities that exist in 
them. "This is the time-honoured method or ethics."3 It was the method of 
lsee Maurice Mandelbaum, The Phenomenolo~ of Moral Experience 
(Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1955), PP• 3-43. Mandelbaum distinguishes 
five approaches to ethical th•or,y, the (1) metaphysical, (2) psychological, 
(3) sociological, (4) phenomenological (in terms or the content of the moral 
consciousness) and (5) phenomen6logical (in terms of the generic character-
istics or all moral experience) approaches. No two approaches need be mutually 
exclusive. Actually every ethical theory uses first one and then another or 
these approaches in gaining solutions to its problems. However, the peculiar 
problems of an ethical theory will depend in some degree uoon which aooroach 
it originally adopts. The basic method or W. D. Ross would fall under aoDroach 
(4). 
2Ross, Foundations, p. 1. 
3Ibid. 
5 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Kant, to name only a few. Aristotle adds 
to his habitual starting-point of a consideration of the opinions of the 
many a consideration of the opinions of the !i!!• 
The method of ethics differl.~ that of the physical sciences. The 
scientist can and must always appeal to the facts of sense-perception, com-
bining careful observations with experience. In ethics one has no such 
direct appeal. The ethicist must start with the opinions contained in ordinary 
ways of thinking and expressed in ordinary language. 
Ross relies heavily upon the moral consciousness, appealing to it in 
determining the meaning of •right' or •obligatio~' and what acts it is one's 
duty to perform. Ross, in one place, sets forth a list of prima facie duties 
which he believes to be binding upon all men. Concerning the listing of 
these duties, he says, 
I should make it plain at this stage that I am assuming the correctness 
of some of our main convictions as to prtma facie duties, or, more 
strictly, am claiming that we know them o be true ••• • The main 
moral convictions of the plain man seem to me to be, not opinions 
which it is for philosop~ to prove or disprove, but knowledge froa 
the start; and in my own case I seem to find little difficulty in 
distinguishing these essential convictions from other moral convictions 
whioh I also have, which are merely fallible opinions based on an 
imperfect study of Ghe working for good or evil of certain institutions 
or types of action. 
In order to see this appeal in action in Ross's arguments, we refer 
to a few relevant passages. Discussing egoistic hedonism, Ross argues that 
it can be sufficiently refuted by one consideration. And this consideration 
is tbe remembering of instances in which one thought some act to be his duty, 
without at all thinking that the doing of that act would bring him more 
pleasure than another act might.5 Concerning evolutionary, reaction, and 
4Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 21. 
5Ross, Foundations, p. 26. 
6 
causal theories of the meaning of •right•, Ross says, "It requires only 
a very little attention to what is in our minds when we use the word 'right•, 
to see that none of these suggested meanings is really in our minds.n6 In 
criticizing the definition of moral suitability in terms of utilitarian 
suitability only, Ross maintains, "Yet I think we have only to exa.dne 
carefully whether that is what we mean when we call an act right, to feel 
assured that it is not so."7 On Pickard-cambridge's claim that a person is 
not under obligation to fulfil a promise if the doing of it would bring more 
pain to the agent than the not doing of it would bring to the patient, Ross 
argues, 
Mr. Pickard-cambridge claims constantly that his view agrees better than 
the opposing view with the ordinary consciousness, but I think that 
this is not how the ordinary consciousness understands promises. I think 
we shoula-iant to know, when someone makes us a promise, whether it 1ft 
an ordinary promise or a Pickard-cambridge promise that he is making. 
B. Should the Moral Consciousness be Criticized in the Light of Theory? 
Those who take a different approach by way of method to the study of 
ethics might object to the appeal to 'what we really think' about moral 
questions as being in principle wrong. Some might argue that the philosopher's 
purpose is not to rest content in what the present moral consciousness tells 
us but to criticize the eXisting moral consciousness in the light of theory. 
No doubt moral theory has over the years modifed the moral consciousness. 
However, one cannot give up his deep moral convictions tor any theory, no 
matter how systematic or consistent it may be. 
6rbid., P• 27. 
1~., P• 55. 
8Ibid., PP• 95-96. See also PP• 101-102, 104, for similar appeals 
against-pfCkard-Gambridge. 
7 
• • • to ask us to give up at the bidding of a theory our actual 
apprehension of what is right and what is wrong seems like asking 
people to repudiate their actual experience or beauty, at the bidding 
of a theory which says 'onlY that which satisfiea such and such con-
ditions can be beautiful'.~ 
Ross would maintain that what we describe as 'what we think' about 
moral questions contains a great a.ount of what we ~· Thus, the findings 
or the moral consciousness should be the standard or reference by which 
any moral theory has to be tested, instead of the moral consciousness 
being tested by reference to a theory. To be sure, the natural scientist 
cannot build ~ theory upon the opinions and interpretations of thought-
ful and educated people. He must always appeal to sense-experience itself. 
But in ethics one has no direct perceptual access to the facts about right-
ness and goodness and the things that are right and good. The only access 
that we have to these facts is by thinking about them. Thus the moral 
convictions of thoughtful and educated people become the data o.f ethics. 
To be sure, some of these convictions have to be rejected. However, they 
are to be rejected only when they come in conflict with other convictions 
which stand up better under the test of reflection. 
The existing body of moral convictions of the best people is the 
cumulative product of the moral reflections of many generations, 
which has developed an extremely delicate power of appreciation of 
moral distinctions; and this the theorist cannot afford to treat with 
anything other than the greatest respect. The verdicts of the moral 
consciousness of the best~people are the foundations on which he must 
build; though he must first compare them with one another and eliminate 
any contradictions they may contain.lO 
Actually, those who would aoproach the study of ethics from the vantage 
point of a moral theory, by which the moral consciousness itself is to be 
9Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 40. 
8 
judged, must themselves ultimatelY appeal to this same moral consciousness. 
Surely the utilitarian, who argues in terms of the principle that only 
those things which will promote the greatest good are good, must ultimately 
appeal to the common moral consciousness, to direct reflection on what we 
really think, in drawing up the list of goods that he puts forward. We 
noted above that Pickard-cambridge, a utilitarian, constantly appeals to 
the ordinary human consciousness in defense of his view about promise-
keeping. 
c. The Hypothetical or Hard Case Method 
A method used by an ethicist to test an ethical theQry when he wants 
to determine whether or not the theory conflicts with his deep ethical 
convictions is what has been called the hypothetical or hard case method. 
I 
Examples of the use ot this method are the fqllowing tests applied to 
Bentham's theory. Bentham held that the right act is always the optimific 
act per se• regardless of how or to whom the pleasure was distributed. 
Test onet double the population (which would theoretically double the 
present existing pleasure) or double the pleasure of those now living. For 
Bentham, since either of these alternatives would, hypothetically, produce 
the same total pleasure, one is not better than the other. However, when 
most people reflect on this case, they find their moral convictions favoring 
the latter. According to their ethical convictions, they do not accept an 
out-and-out hedonistic utilitarianism. Test twot hypothetically, the same 
total pleasure could be obtained by either enslaving a part of the population 
(thus providing a much greater pleasure for the other part of the population) 
or by distributing pleasure equitably among the entire population. For 
9 
Bentham, one alternative is no better than the other. However, most people 
would consider the second alternative to be the best. Thus, again, accord-
ing to their ethical convictions, they do not ~ccept an out-and-out hedon-
istic utilitarianism. 
Quite often these hypothetical cases are very artificial in nature. 
However, their artificiality results from the fact that they are set up 
in such a way as to eliminate all the extenuating circumstances that enter 
into most ethical situations. And being set up in this way, they force one, 
who is in doubt as to what his convictions really are, to face up to the 
clear alternatives. 
Ross uses this method in arguing against Pickard-cambridge's 
utilitarian interpretation of promise-keeping. Ross is convinced that 
most people recognize a prima !!2!! duty to fulfil promises, distinct from 
the duty to produce what is good. This, for him, stands out as a salient 
fact in the moral situation or promise-keeping. But, says Ross, 
••• when we have to deal with theorists who do not admit this, 
perhaps the method of isolating the issue by eliminating 
other considerations affords the best hope or convincing them.ll 
Actually, the hypothetical or hard case method is only a controlled 
way of reflecting upon one's own deepest ethical convictions. And being 
controlled, in the sense of eliminating extraneous consider,tions, it 
is much more likely to lead one to see what his real convictions are 
than uncontrolled reflection might do. 
D. On the Adequacy of Ross's Method 
It was noted above that Ross relies heavily upon the moral conscious-
ness of the "thoughtfUl" and •well-educated" and "best" people. It was 
llaoss, Foundations, p. 105. 
10 
also noted that Ross appeals to his own deepest ethical convictions. Two 
problems arise. In the first place, how is one to determine who are the 
thoughtful and well-educated peoplet Secondly, what does one do when his 
own deepest ethical convictions conflict with the convictions of other 
thoughtful and well-educated people! 
Ross does not explicitly consider these specific problems. Yet it 
seems evident that the above terms ( thoughtful, well-educated, and best) 
could mean aqy number of different things to different individuals. One, 
for example, might think of "the best" people in terms of gregariousness 
and affluence while another might think of them in terms of monastic traits 
and qualities. 
Boss would never have used these terms in the way that he does unless 
he believed in {1) a common moral consciousness of the entire human family; 
(2) the objectivity of obligations and values; and (3) the steady progress 
of the human family toward discovery of and agreement upon those things 
which are right and good (obligations and values). Although even the estab-
lishment of the truth of these three contentions may not rule out an 
element of arbitrariness in the selection of the thoughtful, well-educated, 
and best people, yet their establishaent would lay the groundwork for the 
possibility of the non-arbitrary selection of these people. Their establish-
ment would also lay the groundwork for the understanding and resolution ot 
conflicting ethical convictions. These contentions of Ross will now be 
considered from the perspective of the problems (1) of determining who the 
thoughtful and well-educated people are and (2) of deciding what to do 
when one's own ethical convictions conflict with the convictions of other 
thoughtfUl and well-educated people. 
u 
E. The Identity of Human Nature and the 
Objectivity of Obligations and Values 
Ross believes that there is a fundamental identity of human nature in 
all men. This fundamental human nature, in each individual, if the individual 
is sane, has a clear conviction that certain acts are right and others 
wrong. For Ross, the human mind cannot rest content with the view that 
no moral code is truer than any other, each code simply being necessitated 
by the conditions of its place and time. The human mind can see that one 
moral code is inferior to another. It has ! priori insight into certain 
principles of morality and can distinguish between superior and inferior 
recognition of these prin&iples.12 
There are not merely so many moral codes which can be described and 
whose vagaries can be traced to historical causes; there is a system 
or moral truth, as objective a.s all truth must be, which, and whose 
implications, we are interested in discovering •••• 13 
There was a time in the historical development of the human race 
in which •what is right• was hardly distinguishable from 1what the tribe 
ordains•. But, maintains Ross, we can now clearly see that 'right' does not 
mean •ordained by any given society•.l4 The primitive thinking about what 
things were right and good was largely limited by the customs of race and 
age. This does not mean that the primitive equated •right• with •what my 
race and age ordains•(He probably never considered the question of the 
meaning of 'right• at all). If this had been the case, moral progress 
would never have been possible. Even if a lower consciousness had no notion 
12see ibid., p. 28. 
l~ss, The Right and the Good, P• 15. 
14see ~., p. 12. 
12 
of right at all, this does not mean that certain acts might not be self-
evidently right to a higher consciousness. 
• •• For the nature of the self-evident is not to be evident to every 
mind.however undeveloped, but to be apprehended directly by minds 
which have reached a certain degree of maturity, and for minds to 
reach the necessary degree of maturity the development that takes 
place from generation to generation is f~ much needed as that which 
takes place from infancy to adult life. 
The development or mind from generation to generation was the necessary 
condition for the apprehension of truths that were there all the time 
to be apprehended. Up to a cettain time, perhaps, the human family only 
recognized the naturalistic characteristics of action (e. g., conducive 
to survival or commanded by the co.-unity). But, when the human mind reach-
ed a certain degree of maturity, it was enabled to detect the nonnaturalistic 
characteristic of rightness in a~tiona.l6 
However, mental maturity is no sufficient guarantee of agreement on 
moral questions. Yet, argues Ross, diversities of opinion on moral questions 
rest on disagreements about matters of faot and not on disagreement about 
fundamental moral principles. Disagreement about facts results from (1) 
differences in the circumstances of different people and (2) different 
views of different people. One society may approve of blood-fau4 where 
there is no provision for the public punishment of murderers while a 
society which has this provision may disapprove of blood-feud. The appeal 
in both cases, it would seem, is to the fundamental moral principle of 
justice. Some individuals may approve of fox-huntin& while others disapprove 
or it. The difference between the two need becnly one of opinion-- as to 
the comparative intensity of the pain of the fox and the enjoyment or his 
lSibid. 
16see Ross, Foundations, pp. 16-17. 
1.3 
pursuers.l7 
Even though there are disagreements on the media axiomata of morality 
(moral principles derived from a self-evident rule by applying the rule 
to the actual conditions of the particular society in question), it is more 
justifiable than not to accept the rightness (or wrongness) of an act 
without further consideration if it falls under one of these media axiomata. 
After all, the human family has for generation upon generation been wit-
nessing the consequences of certain .. \&ets and has been drawing conclusions 
about the rightness or wrongness of these acts. Thus, the media axiomata 
become the crystalized product of the experiance and reflection of many 
generations. Usually, to act contrary to the axiomata is to act like the 
child who sets himself up against his parents. But, even so, in the final 
analysis, one must use his own judgment as to what is right and what is 
wrong. Obviously, this is the case when no action presents itself as called 
for by either a basic moral princifie or a medium axioitJ this would also 
be the case in situations where incompatible actions present themselves.l8 
Often when people express different opinions about the rightness or 
wrongness of an act they are differing only because one is thinking of 
objective rightness and the other of subjective rightness. The objective 
element of a situation consists of the facts about the persons and things 
involved in the situation in virtue of which a certain act would actually 
in fact be the fulfillment of bhe obligations resting on the agent. The 
subjective element would consist of the agent's thoughts about the situation. 
Recognizing the difference between subjective and objective rightness 
seem 1 
would tend to reconcile what might/to be irreconcilable differences of opinion. 9 
l7see ~., p. 18. See also pp. 40-41. 
18 See ibid., pp. 174-75. l9see ibid., pp. 146-47. 
14 
Yet all differences of opinion on moral questions are not due entirel7 
to differences of view (outlook) or circumstances. All men, thinks Ross, 
are agreed on basic moral princlples (such as the duties of promise-keeping, 
reparation, and justice). However, there is a real difference or opinion 
as to the comparative value of things that are agreed to be valuable. And 
this difference !! a difference on a moral question. But to admit differences 
or opinion in this region is not to conclude that there is no objective 
truth to be known. A real difference or opinion is evidence of our confidence 
in an objective truth. Just as science has progressed toward a truer and 
truer view of the physical universe, we might expect, thinks Ross, the same 
to be true or moral questions. The moral facts are there; thinking is going 
on about them; the facts will prevail and win our assent. "In the main, 
then, we need not doubt that man progresses fairly steadily towards moral 
truth as he does towards scientific.w20 Even in periods when moral standards 
are given up and moral lawlessness sets in,it is the ~ axioaata and not 
the fundamental moral principles that are called in question. The questioning 
itself is usually an attempt to get down to bedrock in morality. Doubts as 
to the authoritativeness of any or the accepted rules can be relieved by 
an examination or the extant moral rules in a given society with the purpose 
or dividing them into their different classes. In so doing one is enabled 
to see which rules can be validly doubted and which not. Ross himself 
distinguishes four classes or moral rules. 
There are, or may be some whose correctness is self-evident (as, for 
instance, the rule that we should produce as much good as we can); 
some whose rightness can be deduced from a self-evident rule by 
20Ibid., P• 20. One might justly question (1) whether science has 
progressea-ioward a truer and truer view or the physical universe and 
(2) whether moral facts are or the smae kind or type as physical facts. 
At least, the truth of these contentions is not self-evident. 
1$ 
applying the rule to the universal conditions of human nature; some 
which can be derived from a self-evident rule by applying the rule to 
the actual conditions of the particular society; and some which cannot 
be justitied even on that basis and must be discarded as based on 
incorrect views about human nature or physical nature, or on views 
which were ~rue in past conditiens of society but have ceased to be 
true today. 
F. Criticism of Ross 
Has Ross proved or established his contentions (1) that there is a 
common moral consciousness of the entire human race; (2) that obligations 
and values are objective; 4#~ ·6~ that the human family is steadily pro-
greasing toward agreement upon these objective truths? It seems that he 
has not proved the•• Rather, these convictions are set forth by Ross in 
such a way that they can be taken either as assumptions upon which he 
builds his theory or as hypotheses which he believes to be true. But even 
if they are highly probable hypotheses, the possibility of their overthrow 
by new evidence must always be allowed far. 
The question arises as to how much help Ross's presentation of these 
three contentions gives toward the solution of the problems (1) of deter-
mining who the thoughtful and well-educated people are and (2) of deciding 
what to do when one's own ethical convictions conflict with the convictions 
of other people • 
Granting the tru~hr:of Ross's contentions, an arbitrary element would 
remain in the selection of the thoughtful and well-educated people as long 
as all human beings had not discovered and were not in agreement upon 
the objective ethical facts of the universe. The arbitrary element that 
would remain would be that of determining which individuals had progressed 
the most toward the discovery of the>:objective obligations and values. 
16 
As to the arbitration between two conflicting ethical convictions 
there are three alternative positions open to one who would accept the 
truth o.f Ross's contentions. (1) One could conclude that he was wrong in 
his ethical conviction and that, at least in the particular case in question, 
he should not be included among the thoughtful and well-educated people. 
(2) One could conclude that those who disagree are wrong and that they 
should not be included among the thQught.fUl and well-educated peaple. 
(3) Lastly, one could conclude that, although the disputants are all in the 
class o.f the thoughtful and well-educated, their disagreement is not about 
.fundamental moral principles but about •attars of fact resulting from 
different backgrounds and different outlooks. Ross, it seems, would take 
this third alternative. However, when disagreement persists, even Ross 
holds, as was notechabove, that in the .final analysis one must use his 
~judgment as to what is right and what is wrong. 
Thus, although Ross originally adopts the phenomenological approach 
(in terms o.f the content o.f the ,oral consciousness) to the study o.f ethics, 
the admission into his ethical theory of (1) the assumptions of a common 
moral consciousness of the entire human race and the objectivity o.f obligations 
and values and (2) the view that in the final analysis one must use his 
own judgment as to what is right and wrong {that is, one must reflect 
upon his own deepest ethical convictions) somewhat complicates his position. 
His approach becomes not so much the critical study o.f r.he common moral 
consciousness o.f the entire human race as a study of his own {and of others• 
like him in background and temperament) moral consciousness. This is not 
to say, o.f course, that Ross is wrong :i.n holding that there is a common 
moral consciousness, that obligations and values are objective, and that 
men are steadily advancing toward a truer and truer view of the moral life. 
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Ross may well be correct in these contentions. However, it is to say 
that these contentions :.:are:·· .. ;toL::obe: taken as likely hypotheses and not 
as proven.facts. 
We .:see·;, then, that Ross•s ultimate method becomes the critical study 
of his own (and of others' like him in background and temperament) moral 
consciousness. One might well wonder why Ross is so confident of the truth 
of his own deepest ethical convictions. This confidence stems from Ross's 
belief that we have intuitive knowledge (by d.irect insight or reflection) 
of the rightness or wrongness of those acts which fall under the basic 
principles of morality. We move now to an examination of Ross's critical 
ethics -- to a study of his theory of the meaning and justification of ethical 
concepts in terms of the intuitive knowledge of indefinable, irreducible 
concepts or notions. 
rn. 
R6SS '8 CRI'fiOAL ETHICS 
A. The Problem in its Philosophical Context 
Ethical theories are classified in terms of what may be called the 
two questions of ethics. There are two questions that can be asked about 
ethical concepts, (1) What do ethical concepts (e. g., right, ought, duty, 
good, moral, obligation, and reprehensible) •an? (2) What things are right, 
good, etc.? The question of the meaning of ethical concepts is answered 
by analysis. This first question breaks down into two sub-questions. These 
are: (a) How can we decide what is x (x standing for one of our ethical 
concepts)? (b) How can we justit,y our statements that y is x (e. g., that 
promise-keeping is right)? Consideration of the first question of ethics 
is called'critical ethics. Consideration of the second question is ealled 
normative ethics. 
The burden of this chapter is a consideration of Ross's critical ethics--
a consideration of those elements in Ross's theory which distinguish him 
from both naturalists and noncognitivists. 
1. Naturalism 
The essential thesis of ethical naturalism is the proposal that ethical 
statements can be confirmed by observation and inductive reasoning of the 
same kind that is used to confirm statements in the empirical sciences. It 
is held by ethical naturalists that the meani91 of ethical statements is 
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such that one can verifY them in the same way as one verifies, for ex-
ample, statements of psychology or chemistry. However, the answer to the 
question of the meaning of ethical statements differs from naturalist to 
naturalist. 
Many forms of ethical relativism are naturalistic theories. This is 
true of the theories of both Sumner and Westermarck. Sumner, arguing from 
the variation of moral opinion among different peoples,defends a form of 
social relativism. It would seem that Sumner'• analysis of right would be: 
x is right • x is in accordance with the mores of~ or the spe~ker's 
society. Thus, an ethical statement containing the concept right would be 
confirmed, for Sumner, by observation and inductive reasoning.l 
Westermarck, arguing from the correlation of emotion and ethical 
conviction, defends a personal form of re}ativism. Westermarck maintains 
that whenever someone says that something is right or wrong, he is making 
a statement about his emotion of approval or disapproval. His basic 
reason for this position is that there is a perfect correlation between the 
emotions of approval and disapproval and our •oral judgments.2 Perhaps 
his argument could be put in the following form: Whenever someone asserts, 
e. g., "I is wrong", he tends to feel disapproval towards X; the only way 
to explain this correlation is to suppose that the speaker is talking 
about rds own emotions; therefore, the speaker is talking about his own 
emotions. Westermarck also brings in the element of impartiality in the 
situations in which one feels an emotion of approval or d~sapproval.3 In 
lsee w. G. Sumner, Folkways (Boston: Ginn and Co., 1934), PP• 53-64, 
463-64. 
2see E. Westermarck, Ethical Relativity (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 
and Co., 1932), PP• 114-15. 
3~., pp. 90-93. 
20 
the light or these considerations, westermarck 1s theory could be analyzed 
as a relativist form or the ideal observer theory (the absolutist form of 
this theory will be next considered). Thus, for Westermarck, x is right= 
if I were an ideal observer, I would feel approval toward x. 
We have considered two forms of ethical naturalism of a relativist 
nature. It seems that Westermarck's form of relativism explains one of 
the difficulties of settling moral problems -- the difficulty of putting 
oneself into ~e position of an ideal observer. Certainly his theory is 
more plausible than hedonism in that approval and disapproval are much 
more closely connected with ethical judgments than desire or pleasure. 
However, one might agree that there is such an emotion (of approval or 
disapproval) regardless of what ethical position he holds. But there is 
a more serious objection to an analysis such as Westermarck•s. This is that 
the very point or ethical language is to make reference to some objective 
standard -- that is, to avoid relativism. Considerations like this have 
no doubt led some ethical theorists to offer an absolutist version of an 
ideal observer theory. 
In order to see more clearly what an absolutist version of an ideal 
observer analysis of ethical judgments is att.apting to do, we might 
briefly compare this type of analysi• with three other ethical naturalists 
(the two already considered plus Hobbes) in terms of the relationship 
between an ethical judgment and a perceptual judgment. In this regard, 
Hobbes would perhaps analyze a perceptual judgment thus: X is red • X 
looks red to me(at this moment). The analogical ethical judgment for Hobbes 
would bet X is right • X is desired by me now. In like fashionrsumnerra 
~alyses might be the following: (a) X is red • X looks red to most people; 
(b) X is right • X is approved ot by most people (in my social group). 
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Siailarly with Westermarck; (a) X is red = X would look red !£ !! under 
conditions x, y, z, etc.; (b) X is right = X would be approved ~~under 
condit~pns a, b, c, etc. We are now in a position to see how the ideal 
observer theory compares with these three theories as a form of naturalism 
and contrasts with them as itself being an absolutist theory, they being 
relativist theories. The ideal observer analysis follows: (a) X is red = 
X would look red to such and such an observer under such and such conditions; 
(b) X is right • X would produce a feeling of approval in such and such an 
observer under such and such conditions.4 
The ideal condittona of observing that x is red would be, e. g., 
(a) daylight, (b) such and such a distance fDom the thing being observed, 
and (c) clear atmosphere. In this case, an ideal color judge would be one 
who is not colorblind. In a similar fashion, we can ask what conditions 
are appropriate for a correct moral decision. We gain an insight into what 
these conditions might be by examining the qualifications that we require 
of advisers. Moral advisers must have a knowledge of the facts, a broad 
experience of •thical problems, coasistency, and certain intellectual 
characteristics. R. Firth lists as the characteristics of his ideal ob-
server the following: (l) omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts to 
the extent of insuring that no limits are put on the kinds or the quality 
of factual information which are available to influence his ethically 
significant reactions; (2) omnipercipient, having a universal imagination 
in order to be able to visualize simultaneously all actual facta and the 
consequences of all possible acts in a~ given situation; (3) disinterested, 
4For an excellent statement of the ideal observer theory see R. Firth, 
"Ethical Absolutism .and the Ideal Observer," Philosophy and Phenomenological 
Research, XII (1952), 317-45. 
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being completely impartial, not being influenced by interests directed 
toward a particular pe~son or thing but not toward other persons or things 
of the same kind; (4) dispassionate, having no particular emotions directed 
toward objects because they are thought to have one or more essentially 
particular properties; (5) consistent, whose ethically-significant reactions 
to any particular act would always be exactly similar; and (6) in other 
respects normal, that is, a person.S 
Firth•s thesis is that ethical statements are statements about an 
ideal observer and his ethically-significant reactions. His analysis of 
ethical judgments thus uecomes: X is right = X is approved by an ideal 
observer. 
2. Noncognitivisa 
The noncognitivist holds that ethical statements cannot be taken 
to be scientific statements, confirmable by observation and inductive 
reasoning. Further, he rejects the thesis that ethical statements are 
statements of fact and that their primary job is to convey information, 
holding that ethical language either expresses moral attitudes or declares 
the speaker's policy or issues commands or prescribes what people are to 
do. 
The major noncognitive theories are the emotive and performative 
theories. The emotive theory grew out of a radical empiricist theory of 
meaning, by whiobiit was held that judgments are meaningful only to the 
extent that they are confirmable by experience. If words do not characterize 
anything, then they have neither cognitive nor assertive ••.-laa. Since it 
is clear, the argument goes, that ethical statements do not characterize 
anything at all (e. g., the judgment, n.mocracy is good, does not character-
ize anything), their meaning must be found in terms of noncognitive functions. 
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Early forms of the emotive theory are those of Carnap and Ayer.6 
Perhaps the classic work in emotive ethics is c. Stevenson's 
Ethics and Language.7 Stevenson is not only an emotivist but also a 
relativist. The absolutist would hold that two people who disagree in 
their ethical judgments are making logically incompatible statements, 
both of which cannot be true. The relativist, however, would hold that 
in ethical disagreement one does not have conflicting statements because 
of the egocentric term in the ethical judgment (e. g., X'•.ls right • !. 
desire X, or X is right: X is approved.by~ The onll kind of disagree-
ment, for Stevenson, that can occur when people make see~ng~ contra-
dictory ethical judgments is disagreement in attitude. Individuals are 
only expressing conflicting attitudes. Thus, it follows that there is no 
difference between a good and a bad •thical argument except in effective-
ness of presentation to convince others. Stevenson would analyze ethical 
judgments in the following wayt X is right : I approve of XJ do so as 
well& Or perhaps, being more purely emotive: X is right = X hurrahl Do so 
as we1118 
Performative theories or ethical judgments are positions that 
developed out or the emotive theory. These theories are an advance on the 
emotive theory. In the first place, they encourage us to notice the details 
of the use or ethical terms in various contexts. In this sense there is 
a prima facie case for this view, for quite often ethical terms are used 
---· ----6a. Carnap, Philoso~h~ and Logical Syntax (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, 
Trubner, and Co., Ltd., 1 3 ), especially sects. 11 2, 4. A. J. ~er, 
Langua~e~ Truth, and Logic (New York: Dover Publications, Inc., 1946), 
PP• lO - O. 
7c. L. Stevenson, Ethics and Language (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1960). 
8Ibid., pp. 20-36. Some have humorously called the emotive theory 
the alasl hurrahl theory. 
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for purposes other than that of making statements. They are used at times 
to express tastes and preferences, at other times to advise, and at other 
times to admonish.9 Thus, ethical judgments become multi-functional, not 
being capable of any one analysis. Secondly, by recognizing distinctive 
and standard implications of ethical language, the performativist is 
allowed to say that ethical utterances are sometimes misleading or im-
proper, thus approaching close to the naturalist view that ethical utterance& 
are true or false. However, the performativist continues to maintain that 
ethical statements are not statements of fact and that their primary job 
is not to convey information. 
3. Nonnaturalism 
Nonnaturalists agree with naturalists in holding that ethical teraa 
refer to properties and, in this sense, that ethical statements are 
statements about facts that are true or false according as they describe 
the facts correctly or incorrectly. However, the nonnaturalist does not 
agree with the naturalist about the meaning of ethical statements and 
cons~ently cannot accept the naturalist's conte~tion that ethical judg-
ments are verifiable by observation. One can, according to the nonnaturalist, 
know that ethical statements are true, but this knowledge comes, not by 
observation, but by •intuition• ori•rational insight•. A corollary thesis 
is that ethical terms are unanalyzable and thus indefinable. 
The most prominent form of nonnaturalisa is rational intuitionism. 
Representatives of this position are Butler, Sidgwick:, Rashdall, Prichard, 
G. E. Moore, C. D. Broad, W. D. Ross, and A. c. Ewing. 
Basically, intuitionism is an epistemological doctrine. For the 
intuitionist reason has the capacity to grasp certain moral concepts 
(e. g., rightness, wrongness, good, and bad) or certain moral truths 
9see P. Nowell-8Jiith, Ethics (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1954), P• 98. 
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(e. g., lying is wrong) or both. These concepts are not grasped by the 
senses ~the way that, for example, the concept "red" is grasped by the 
senses. Traditionally rationalists have held that reason has three functions 
or powers, these being the deductive, the inductive, and the intuitive 
functions. The intuitive function can be illustrated by Descartes example 
of the intuiti~B that one has that the wax which melts is the same wax which 
was once solid. There are two positions that have been held about the 
manner in which reason grasps (or intuits) ethical truths. These are called 
(1) perceptual intuitionism and (2) dogmatic intuitionism. Perceptual 
intuitionist. hold that the process of reason here is b.1 means of observations 
of particulars leading to generalil~~ions. Butler is an example of this 
type of intuitionist. The dogmati• intuitionist does not divide the rational 
act into the two acts of observation and induction. He holds that the 
truth of a general rule can be seen in a particular case. Ross is an example 
of this type or intuitionist. 
Having seen the problem of intuitionism in its philosophical context, 
Ross's particular theory in regard to intuitionism must be considered in 
detail. 
B. Ross's Theor.y 
1. The Knowledge of Particular Ethical Facts 
Rightness, for Ross, is always a resultant attribute, an attribute 
that an act has because it has another attribute. One may plrceive a particular 
extended patch to be yellow or a particular noise to be loud without any 
knowledge of the causes that account for these facts. The attributes in 
question (yellow and loud) attach to the subjects (patch and noise) merely 
as these subjects, not as subjects of such and such a character. However, 
on the other hand, it is only by knowing or thinking that an act {e. g., 
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leading a blind man across the street through heavy traffic) has a 
particular character, out of the many that it in fact has, that one 
knows or thinks that he ought to do it (that it is right}. lhe leading 
of a blind man across the street is, among other things, the directing of 
a physical body in a certain direction. But one does not ~hink that it is 
right in consequence of this. One thinks that it is right because it is 
the relieving of a human being from distress. Thus the rightness of the act 
of leading the blind man across the street is a resultant attribute. It is 
the attribute that that act has ~cause it has another attribute, the 
attribute of being a case of the relief of human distreaa.lO 
It would seem at first sight that one's perception of the particular 
duty of leading the blind man across the street follows from the perception 
of a general duty to relieve human beings in distress. Thus one might want 
to generalize and say that the perception of particular duties is always 
an act of inference, in which some general moral principle is the major 
premiss. However, Ross maintains that one•s perception of particular 
duties is not essentially inference from general principles. Man was a 
practical being before he becaae a theoretical one and first answered the 
question of how he ought to behave in particular circums,ances before he 
entered upon general speculation upon the principles of duty. Actually, 
the first human beings did right acts (e. g., the disinterested operation 
of parental love) without even asking whether they were right or not. But 
as men matured and as they gave more attention to their acts, they came to 
recognize certain acts as suitable to a situation and then as called for 
by a situation. 
lOsee Rosa, Foundations, p. 168. 
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Thus first, as belonging to particular *cts in virtue or a particular 
character they possessed, was rightness recognized. Their rightness 
was not deduced from any general principle; rather the general principle 
was later recognized by intuitive induction as being implied in the 
judgments already passed on particular acts.ll . 
Once general principles are reached, particular acts could be 
recognized as right either by deduction from general principles or by 
direct reflection on the acts as particular acts having a certain character. 
Ross holds that it is by direct insightl2 and not by deduction that 
particular acts, even when we have general principles, are seen to be right 
or wrong.13 However, there are two kinds of situation in which individual 
r.cts ~ apprehended by deduction from general principles. 
2. Moral Truths Deduced From General Principles 
In morals the two kinds of situation in which individual facts are 
apprehended by deduction from general principles are those in which the 
general principle is either (1) accepted on authority or (2) not self-
evident but has itself been reached by reasoning, being the consequence or 
a proof'.l4 
There is a stage in most people's lives when they accept some moral 
principle on authority before actually coming to recognize its truth for 
themselves. In such a case the rightness or wrongness or the particular act 
is not aporehended on its own .writs but read off' from the general prin-
ciple. Against the suggestion that people never pass beyond the stage or 
1lrbid., P• 110. 
12Ross uses the terms~irect insigh~~'insight~~irect reflection~, 
and 1~erception-interchangeably. Perception here must not be understood as 
sense perception, but as an insight analogous to sense perception in immediacy, 
being an immediate or intuitive cognition. 
13Ibid., P• 171. 
14rbid. 
accepting moral principles on authority, it can be urged (a) that the 
rjference to authority commits us to an infinite regress or leads us back 
to someone who did recognize the priD4~ple on its own merits and (b) that 
carefUl introspection yields a distinction between the acceptance of a 
principle on authority and its acceptance on its own merits (i. a., there 
is a difference between the must-conscience and the ought-conscience).15 
There occurs also the other situation in which the general principle 
may have bean accepted on its own merits and not on authority. However, 
its recognition may have involved an elaborate consideration of the probable 
consequences of a certain type of act (e. g., this might be true of such 
a princ~ple as ·t.he principle that indiscriminate charity is wrong). Thus, 
in such a case, the rightness or wrongness of an individual act (e. g., an 
individual act of indiscriminate charity) is not self-evident. To see the 
self-evidence or the rightness or wrongness of such an act would involve 
the tracing out of the probable consequences. This, however, is usua~ly not 
done, but the general principle is remembered and the rightness or wrongness 
of the particular act is read orr fraa it.l6 
But, holds Ross, these two kinds of situation in which individual 
acts are apprehended by deduction to be right or wrong are unique; there 
are no other kinds of situation in which individual moral facts are deduced 
from general principles. And further, thefe general principles (which are 
not self-evident) are not among the basis principles of morality. Says Ross, 
Our insight into the basic principles of morality is not of this order. 
When we consider a particul~n~ffo!fod lie, or as the breaking of a 
promise, or as a gratuitous/o~p81n, we do not need to, and do not, fall 
back on a remembered general principle; we see the individual act to be 
by its very nature wrong.l7 
15see ibid., PP• 171-72. 
16see ~·, p. 172 .• 17Ibid., P• 173. 
- . 
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These basic principles are formulated by Ross in terms of what he 
calls prima f!£~ duties. Boss's theory of duties will be considered in 
detail in the next chapter. However, in order to see what Ross considers 
to be the basic principles of morality, they are listed here. They are: 
(1) duties of fidelity and reparation; (2) duties of gratitude; (J) duties 
of justice; (4) duties of beneficence; (5) duties of self-improvement; and 
(6) duties of non-maleficence.l8 
Ross, then distinguishes between these basic principles of morality 
and other general principles of morality in terms of how we come to know 
of the rightness or wrongness of individual acts which fall under any one 
principle. Ross claims intuitive insight of the rightness or wrongness of 
only those acts which fall under the basic principles of morality. But 
even concerning the basic principles of morality, Ross makes an important 
distinction between what he calls prima facie duties and actual duties 
in terms of one's knowledge of the rightness or wrongness of such duties. 
J. The Knowledge of Prima Facie Duties and Actual Duties 
Ross maintains that, although certainty attaches to our recognition 
of the basic principles of duty (prima facie duties), our judgments about 
particular duties (actual duties) in concrete situations have none of this 
certainty. 
A statement is certain, i. e. is an expression of knowledge, only in 
one or other of two cases: when it is either self-evident, or a valid 
conclusion from self-evident premisses. And our jud~ents about our 
particular duties have neither of these characters. 9 
Judgments about particular duties are not self-evident. One can 
never be certain whether he ought or ought not to do a particular act, 
18see Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 20. 
19see ~., P• 30. 
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since all possible acts have characteristics in virtue of which they are 
erima facie right and other characteristics in virtue of which they are 
prima facie wrong. One may come ib the long run, after consideration, to 
think of one duty as more pressing than another, but one does not feel certain 
that it is so. Even if one does not recognize that a possible act has two 
such characteristics, he can never be certain that the act has not in fact 
such characteristics; thus, he can never be certain that the act is right, nor 
certain that it is wrong. And fUrther, any particular act will probably 
eventually contribute to the bringing about of good or of evil for many 
human beings, thus having a prima facie rightness or wrongness of which 
one knows nothing.20 
Nor are judgments about particular duties logical conclusions from 
self-evident premisses. The only self-evident premisses that one has are 
those stating the prima f!2!! rightness or wrongness of particular acts in 
virtue of their having the different characteristics that they do have; 
and there is no principle by which one can draw the conclusion that a 
particular act is on the whole right or on the whole wrong.21 
In this respect the judgment as to the rightness of a particular act 
is just like the judgment as to the beauty of a particular natural 
object or work of art. A poem is, for instance, in respect or certain 
qualities beautiful and in respect of certain others not beautiful; 
and our judgment as to the degree or beauty it possesses on the whole 
is never reached by logical reasoning from the apprehension of its 
particular beauties or particular defects. Both in this and in the 
moral case we have more or less probable opinions which are not logically 
justified conclusions from the general principles that are recognized 
as self-evident.22 
20see ~., PP• 30-31. 
2lsee ibid., P• 31 • 
......... 
22~., P• 31. 
31 
Ross's claim for the intuitive knowledge of moral truths has been 
shown to be somewhat limited in scope. Only the basic principles of 
morality (prima facie duties) are known self-evidently and with certainty 
to be true. One's knowledge of moral truths that are apprehended by 
deduction from general principles which have been accepted on authority 
or which are not self-evident and one's knowledge of the rightness or 
wrongness of particular acts are never self-evident or certain. But to 
claim self-evidence and certainty for even the basic principles of morality 
is to make a claim of considerable importance and consequence. The claim is 
important because all other moral claims are ultimately grounded in these 
basic principles. To be certain of one•s basic principles is to be well 
on the way to establishing the truth of one's overall ethical theory. 
Ross's position, however, has been criticized on several scores. 
Objections to his theory of the intuitive knowledge of basic moral 
principles must now be considered. 
c. Objections to Ross's Theory of Intuitive Knowledge 
1. The Problem of Error 
A p~oblem for Ross as an intuitionist is the problem of error. 
It is generally objected that one could be thinking that he is having a 
true intuition when, as a matter of fact, he is not. And, if it is possible 
to be mistaken in this matter, then one cannot justifiably speak of intuitive 
knowledge as being self-evident and certain. 
It was notec:l.:above that Ross distinguishes between the knowledge of 
basic principles of duty and the knowledge of concrete duttes, claiming 
intuitive knowledge of the basic principles only. Ross admits that one 
can be mistaken about what he believes to be his actual duty in a concrete 
situAtion. "• •• We cannot, in general, claim intui~ve or any other kind 
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of certainty as to the actual (or resultant) rightness of particular 
acts ••• • we move in a region of uacertainty.n23 However, Ross would 
not admit, it would seem, the possibility of being mistaken about the 
intuitive certainty of a basic principle of morality. These principles, 
according to him, are as self-evident as anything could be. 
I should make it plain • • • that I am assuming the correctness of 
some of our main convictions as to ptima facie duties, or, more strictly, 
am claiming that we know them to be rue. To me it seems as self-
evident as anYthing could be, that to make a prom~~e, for instance, 
is to create a moral claim on us in someone else. 4 
To claim knowledge for a moral principle is not necessarily to 
claim certainty for it' unless certainty is to be included in the idea 
of self-evidence). However, Ross defines knowledge in terms of certainty 
in a context in which he is discussing the knowledge of the basic principles 
of morality. 
A statement is certain, i. e. is an expression of knowledge, only in 
one or other of two cases: when it is either self-evident, or a 
valid coaclusion from self-evident premisses.25 
But, to claim certainty for a moral statement is not necessarily 
to claim that one's knowledge of the statement is inerrant. For in claim-
ing certainty one may be only claiming psychological certainty (or certi-
tude) and not logical certainty. It seems, however, although there is room 
for di a agreement, tha_t Ross is claiming logical certainty for the knowledge 
of the basic principles of morality. This interpretation seems to follow 
from Ross's comparison of one's knowledge of fundamental moral principles 
with one's knowledge of the axioms of mathematics. 
23Ross, Foundations, PP• 320.21. 
24Ross, The Right and the Good, PP• 20-21. 
25Ibid., P• 30. 
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Both alike seem to be both synthetic and a priori; that is to say, 
we see the predicate, though not included in the definition of the 
subject, to belong necessarily to anything which satisfies that 
definition.26 
Thus, for example, the statements "if x is greater than y and y is greater 
than z, then x is greater than z" and "promise-keeping is a duty" are syn-
thetic and ! priori. Both fundamental moral principles and the axioms 
of mathematics are 11 evident without any need of proof, or of evidence 
beyond themselves. 11 "In both cases we are dealing with propositions that 
cannot be proved, but that just as certainly need no proof.•'7 
It may be disputed whether the fundamental moral principles are syn-
thetic and ! priori. Perhaps it m~ also be disputed whether the claim for 
synthe~city and apriority entails a claim for logical certainty. On our 
interpretation, logical certainty is entailed. And, if this interpreta-
tion be correct, then Ross can be taken to be claiming the impossibility 
of being mistaken about the intuitive certainty of the truth of a basic 
moral principle. 
2. The Complication of Epistemology and 
The Admission of Too Many Intuitions 
Another charge made against intuitionism (of which Ross is an ex~onent) 
is that it com~licates our epistemology. It multiplies, so to speak, en-
tities beyond necessity. Why admit, goes the objection, an intuitive tunc-
tion of the m:nd, when the phenomena of ethics can be explained in terms 
of induction and/or deduction only? The objection here is a petitio prin-
~ipi. One of the main arguments of intuitionism is that induction and/ 
9.r ~~~!l.c!i~2~. ~q~t- ~-~S~.a~!7 !~l~!.n _tbe ph!JJl()mena_ <?f ~~~- mor~!- !!.~~-· 
26Ross, Foundation!, P• 320. 
27aoss, The Right and the Good, p.30. 
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To be sure, the intuitionist may be wrong on this score, but we cannot 
rule out his position from the start before his claim is examined. 
A similar objection leveled against intuitionism is that it admits 
too many intuitions. Of course, most ethical systems admit intaition 
at some point. 
Utilitarianism in the general form represented by Professor Moore's 
ethical writings admits the sup~sed intuition that only what is pro-
ductive of the greatest good is right. Hedonistic Utilitarianism 
adds to this the supposed intuition that only pleasure is intrinsically 
good. Sidgwick's form of hedonistic Utilitarianism adds to these 
intuitions two that contradict the essential principle'of Utilitar-
ianism, the 'axiom of rational self-love' and the 'axiom of justice•. 
The objection that many people feel to Intuitionism can hardly be 
an objection to the admission of intuition; for without that no theory 
can get ~6tng. The objegtion rather is that Intuitionism admits too 
many intuitions. • • • 2 
Naturally a theory which admits only one intuition satisfies our wish to 
reach unity and simplicity in our moral theory. But it is more important 
that theory be true than that it be simple. It is " ••• a mistake in 
principle to think that there is any presumption in favour of the truth 
of a mqnistic against a pluralistic theory in morals, or, for that matter, 
in metaphysics either .Jti9 What we are looking for is not a symmetrical 
architectonic or a hastily reached simplioity. We want loyalty to the7,::':. 
facts. A system, to be valid, must square with the facts of the moral 
consciousness. Any appeal to the ease of applying one viewcm another is 
beside the mark. 
The objections o~ the grounds of complicating epistemology and of 
admitting too many intuttions only point up the age-old tension between 
Ockham's razor (do not multiply entities beyond necessity) and Butler's 
"everything is what it is and not another thing". One's theory should be 
28Ross, Foundations, P• 82. 
29 ~., P• 83. 
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as si.,+e and monistic as possible. But the facts must never be sacrificed 
in favor of simplicity. Many intuitions certainly cannot be ruled out on 
such ! priori grounds.30 
D. A Related Doctrine: The Indefinability of Ethical Terms 
The position that ethical terms are indefinable is very closely 
connected with intuitionism in that the intuitionist position usually 
follows upon a rejection of all other attempts at defining ethical terms. 
Ross takes this position with respect to the ethical terms, right and good. 
He· holds that both right and good are indefinable, irreducible concepts 
or notions.31 
o. E. Moore had argued, for example, against any attempt to define 
'good', that given any set of concepts used to define 'good', but not 
containing 'good•, it is always possible to inquire whether a thing answer-
ing to this set of concepts is good. If someone claimed that 'what is good 
is what is desired by somebody', this claim could be met by the fact that 
although war is desired by some people one may still doubt whether war is 
good. or if someone claimed that 1good means conducive to pleasure•, this 
claim could be met by the fact that it is doubtful whether all those things 
conducive to pleasure are good.32 
Ross thinks tbat Moore's argument amounts to saying, 
••• that if'good' stood for any complex (as on any relational theory 
it does), we ought, if we use the word intelligently, to have in our 
minds the notion of a definite relation between definite things. It 
seems to me clear that we have no such notion in our minds when we use 
30ferhaps o. E. Moore anticipated the objection to his ethical theory 
on the principle of Ockham•s razor when, on the title page to Princiaia 
Ethica, he uses as his "motto" Butler's "ever,ything is what it is an 
not another thing"• 
3lsee Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 12, 92-93. 
32see G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, pp. 10, 13-14, 66-67, 118. 
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the word in ordinary discourse.JJ 
Ross, howeYer, is not sure that this entirely settles the question. There 
is such a thing as using a term which implicitly refers to a certain com-
plex, before the complex is explicitly present to ~ne•s mind. This might 
be true, in principle, with •good 1 • The absence of an explicit reference 
in the case of 'good' should not be taken as necessarily implying that the 
term is indefinable or that it could not stand for a relation. 
Ross's method is that of attending to any proposed definition and 
by the term in quesiion. Thus, Ross examines and rejects, among others, 
the evolutionary (e. g., 'right' means 'comparatively evolved'), reaction 
(e. g., •right' means •evokes the emotion of approval•), causal (e. g., 
•right' means •such as to produce most pleasure for all human beings•), 
and positivistic definitions of right.34 Likewise he examines and rejects 
the definitions of good as 'comprehensiveness•, 'being productive of 
pleasure•, and 'being an object of desirer.JS After examining all the 
definitions that possess any initial plausibility, Ross rejects them all. 
Concerning 'right• Ross says, "• • • right is an indefinable notion. 
And this is the conclusion to which t am myself led by the breakdown of 
the attempts to define rightness which we have considered.n36 And concerning 
'good• Ross concludes, 
••• we may feel fairly confident that 1 good 1 is indefinable. And 
there is no initial presumption that it is definable. For it seems 
33Boss, The Right and the Good, p. 92. 
34see Ross, Foundations, PP• 12-42. 
3Ssee ibid., PP• 252-79. 
36Ibid., P• 42. 
37 
clear that there could be no complex entities unless there were some 
simple ones, and, in a universe so various as the universe is, there 
is no reson to suppose that the simple entities are few in number.37 
Ross, of course, does not claia certainty for his view that the 
ethical terms, right and good, are indefinable. Although none of the 
definitions that have been advanced by ethical theorists satisf.y him, 
the possibility of a satisfactor,y definition remains. 
E. S~cy 
The burden of this chapter has been a consideration of Ross's 
critical ethics. To distinguish him from both naturalists and noncogni-
tivists1 Ross is classified as a nonnaturalist or intuitionist. Ross 
agrees with the naturalist, in opposition to the noncognitivist, that 
ethical statements are statements about facts that are either true or 
false. However, he differs from the naturalist in holding that ethical 
judgments are not verifiable by observation. 
According to Ross ethical statements are known to be true by 
intuition or direct insight. This is only the case, however, with the 
basic or fUndamental principles of morality (for Ross,these are the prin-
ciples setting forth prima facie duties). One's knowledge of moral truths 
that are apprehended by deduction from general principles which have been 
accepted on authority or which are not self-evident, and one's knowledge 
of the rightness or wrongness of particular duties are not gained by 
intuition; this knowledge is never self-evident or certain. Ross insists, 
on the line of interpretation taken in this chapter, on the impossibility 
of being mistaken about the intuitive certainty of the truth of a bas1o 
moral principle. 
37Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 93. 
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The objections to Ross's intuitionism on the grounds of complicating 
epistemology and of admitting too many intuitions cannot be permitted. 
Facts must never be sacrificed in favor of simplicity. Ross's intuitionism 
cannot be ruled out on such ! priori grounds. 
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that the concern of 
critical ethics is the consideration of the meaning of ethical concepts. 
This consideration was bro~en down into the two questions: (1) How can 
we decide what is x (x standing for one of our ethical concepts)? (2) How 
can we justif,y our statements that y is x (e. g., that promise-keeping is 
right)? Ross answers the first question by maintaining, after examining 
and rejecting all the definitions that possess any initial plausibility, 
that both right and good are indefinable, irreducible concepts or notions. 
One's statements that y is x and w is x (y and w standing for prima facie 
duties, e. g., promise-keeping and gratitude) are justified, according 
to Ross, in terms of intuition or direct insight. 
Critical ethics examines the question of the meaning of ethical 
concepts. However, there remains the normative question which concerns 
itself with determining what things are right and good. The burden of the 
following chapter is an examination of Ross's normative ethics. 
IV. 
ROSS'S NORMATIVE ETHICS 
Normative ethical theories atte•pt to determine what things are 
right and good. There are two major types of normative theories; these 
are the teleological and formalist theories. 
Teleological (or utilitarian or result) theories have in common the 
view that one's overall moral obligation depends entirely on the intrinsic 
worth of the actual or expected results of the acts which one might perform. 
Hedonistic utilitarians (e. g., Hume, Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick) hold 
that what makes actions right is that they are productive of the most or 
greatest pleasure.1 Ideal utilitarians (e. g., G. E. Moore and Hastings 
Rashdall) maintain that what makes actions right is that they are productive 
of the most or greatest good (good including other things besides pleasure).2 
Formalists claim that the thesis of teleological theories is too 
simple. They hold in common the view that one's moral obligations are 
dependent on other things in addition to (or instead of) the intrinsic 
value of the results of one's acts. For example, a formalist may hold that 
lsee, e. g., Jeremy Bentham, selections, in I. A. Malden, ed., 
Ethical Theories: A Book of Readin (New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1955), 
PP• 3 - • See also J. s. Mill, in Kelden, £2· cit., PP• 368-73. 
2
see Hastings Rashdall, The Theo~ of Good and Evil (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1907), Vol. I, p. 194. See also • E. Moore, Principia Ethica 
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1929), op. 224-25. 
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one is morally obligated to keep his promises regardless of the consequences 
of keeping or breaking them. A distiaotion must be made, however, between 
extreme formalist theories and moderate formalist theories •• An extreme 
formalist, like Kant, holds that duties are absolut duties, e. g., that 
all men must keep promises, there being no exceptions to this rule.J A 
moderate formalist, although maintaining that it is one's duty to keep 
promises, holds that in some situations, where other duties impinge upon 
the individual, one may not be obligated to keep promises. Ross is a 
moderate formalist. 
Before Ross's normative theory is studied in detail, his criticism 
of utilitarian theories will be examined. 
A. The Criticism of Utilitarian Theories 
In criticizing utilitarian theories, ideal utilitarianism is the 
only view that, according to Ross, needs to be considered. This is true, 
thinks Ross, for two reasons: (1) ideal utilitarianism is more attractive 
than hedonistic utilitarianism and (2) it is one of the logicabases of 
hedonistic utilitarianism. It seems to be clear on reflection that pleasure 
is not the only thing in life which we think good in itself. Thus, it 
constitutes a great advance to' substitute, as the ideal utilitarian does, 
'productive of the greatest good' for 'productive of the greatest pleasure•. 
But, further, hedonistic utilitarianism could not be true unless ideal 
utilitarianism were true, while the latter might be true though the former 
were not.4 
Jsee I. Kant, selections, in Malden, ~· cit., pp. 295-JOJ, 307-16. 
4see Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 16-17. 
For the view that what produces the maximum pleasure is right has for 
its bases the views (1) that what produces the maximum good is right, 
and (2) that pleasure is the only thing good in itself. If they were 
not assu.tng that what produces the maximum good is right, the 
utilitarians•attempt to show that pleasure is-ina only thing good in 
itself, which is in fact the point they take most pains to establish, 
would have been quite irrelevant to their attempt to prove that only 
what produces the maximum pleasure is right. If, therefore, it can be 
shown that productivity of the maximum good is not what makes all 
actigns right, we shall ! fortiori have refuted hedonistic utilitarian-
ism. 
Against the thesis of ideal utilitarianism Ross offers two general 
criticisms. (1) He argues that the theory unduly simplifies our relations 
to our fellowmen. For all practical purposes, it considers the relationship 
in which neighbors are possible beneficiaries of one's action to be the 
only morally significant relation. But surely the relations of "• • • promisee 
to promiser, of creditor to debtor, of wife to husband, of child to parent, 
of friend to friend, or fellow countryman to fellow countryman, and the 
like ••• "6 are also morally significant. For Ross, each of these relations 
is a foundation of a prima facie duty which is more or less incumbent upon 
a person depending upon the circumstances of each case.7 
(2) Further, Ross holds, ideal utilitarianism does not correspond with 
the moral consciousness, with what we really think about moral questions. 
For example, the ordinary individual keeps promises because he thinks he 
ought to do so, not because he gives thought to their total consequences. 
What makes the act right for him is that he has promised to do it. In 
cases of ~onflict of duty, our problem is not resolved by asking 'by 
which action will most good be produced?' If, for example, we find our-
selves in a situation where both the duty of fulfilling promises and the 
5Ibid., p. 17. 
6 ~·~ P• 19. 
1see ibid. 
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duty of benevolence impinge upon us, we really think that promise~ 
keeping should came before benevolence, except in the case where the good 
to be produced by the benevolent act is very great and where the promise 
is comparatively minor (e. g., a promise to meet a friend at a particular 
time for some trivial purpose). To think oneself justified in breaking 
the promise in order to do the benevolent act (e. g., to prevent a serious 
accident) does not have to be due to one's thinking that he shall bring 
more good into existence by the one action than by the other. A different 
account, which Ross thinks to be the true one, can be given of the matter. 
One could think it right to do the benevolent act at the cost of not 
keeping the promise, not because he thinks more good will be produced 
thereby, but because he thinks that the benevolent act is the duty which 
is in the circumstances more of a duty than that of promise-keeping. This, 
thinks Ross, corresponds more closely with what we really think in such 
a situation.s 
If, so far as I can see, I could bring equal amounts of good into 
being by fulfilling ~ promise and by helping some one to whom I 
had made no promise, I should not hesitate to regard the former as 
my duty. Yet on the view that what is right is right b~cause it is 
productive of the most good I should not so regard it.~ 
However, although productivity of good may be different from right-
ness, perhaps it is the universal ground of rightness. But how could we 
know this? There are three possibilities. We could know it either (1) by 
an immediate intuition or (2) deductively or (3) inductively. No one has 
attempted to prove it deductively (lbat middle term could be used to 
connect the two terms, productivity of good and universal grou~ of 
rightness?). The possible alternatives are intuition and induction.lO 
Bsee ~., PP• 17-18. 
lOsee Ross, Foundations, p. 68. 
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What can be said for the inductive establishment of the view that 
productivity of good is the ground of rightness? 
Such an inquiry, to be conclusive, would have to be very thorough and 
extensive. We should have to take a large variety of the acts which 
we, to the best of our ability, judge to be right. We should have to 
trace as far as possible their consequences, not only for the persons 
directly affected but also for those indirectly affected; and to these 
no limit can be set. To make our inquiry thoroughly conclusive, we 
should have to do what we cannot do, viz. trace these consequences 
into an unending future. And even to make it reasonably conclusive, 
we should have to trace them far into the future. It is clear that 
the most we could possibly say is that a large variety of typical 
acts that are judged right appear, so far as we can trace their 
cpnsequences, to produce more good than any other acts possible to 
the agents in the circumstances. And such a result is far short of 
proving the constant connection of the two attributes. But it is 
surely clear that no inductive inquir,y justifying even this result 
has ever been carried through. The advocates of utilitarian systems 
have been so much persuaded either of the identity or of the self-
evident connection of the attributes "right" and "optimific" (or 
"felicific") that they rtve not attempted even such an inductive 
inquiry as is possible. 
Nor is it self-evident, claims Ross, that goodness is the only 
possible ground of rightness. There are several facts which tell against 
this view. (1) It is clear that it is not our duty to increase the total 
happiness regardless of how the happiness is distributed. A utilitarian, 
it seems, would have to maintain that it is self-evident that the pro-
motion of a certain amount of virtue spread out thinly over a certain 
population is better than the promotion of a slightly smaller amount 
concentrated in a much smaller population (average virtue thus being 
greater). This is not self-eVident. (2) If the utilitarian principle is 
true, it ought to be a matter of indifference how extra happiness is dis-
tributed among a population. However, the principle of justice enters in 
here, which bids us to fairly divide happiness equally between people of 
&'lUfliHl moral worth and unequally between people of unequal moral worth. 
llRoss, The Right and the Good, p. 36. See also Ross, Foundations, 
P• 68. 
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But, in distributing happiness in this way, it is quite possible that 
we might produce a smaller increase of total happiness than if we had 
distributed the happiness (or good) in some other (thOQgh unfair) way. 
(3) Further, a problem arises in the matter of the distribution of 
pleasure between an agent and anyone else. According to the utilitarian 
principle one should produce a greater pleasure for himself than a 
smaller pleasure for another. But do we ever judge this to be the case? 
No, we never really think ourselves morally bound to increase our own 
pleasure. Actually, Ross's criticism in each of these three cases relies 
upon what is considered by him to be a self-evident prima ~ duty.l2 
We shall now examine Ross's positive theory of duties. 
B. Prima Facie Duties and Actual Duties 
A prima facie duty (or 'conditional duty 1 ) 13 is the characteristic 
or tendency which an act has to be one's duty. It is a parti-resultant 
attribute of an act, one which belongs to an act in virtue or some one 
component in its nature. In virtue of another component or its nature, 
an act may have a tendency to call forth another duty. An act may be both 
a duty of fidelity resting on an implicit promise and a duty of gratitude. 
Likewise, conflicting prima facie duties may impinge upon an individual 
. 
at one and the same time. It may be one's prima facie duty to keep a pro-
mise to a very sick invalid by telling him that he is dying of cancer, 
while at the same time it may be his prima facie duty (of benevolence) 
to break his promise in the interests of the well-being of the invalid.l4 
12see Ross, Foundations, PP• 69-75. 
1~ichard suggests the word 'claim' instead of 'prima facie duty•, 
Carritt the word 'responsibility•. See ibid., p. 85. -----
14see Ross, The Right and the Good, PP• 19-20, 27-28. 
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A ,dujly proper or an actual duty is a toti-resultant attribllte, 
one which belongs to an act in virtue of its whole nature. One's actual 
duty depends on all the morally significant kinds of prima ~ duties 
that a particular action is an instance of. In the case of the invalid, 
where the prima facie duties of promise-keeping and of benevolence both 
make their claims upon the agent, the actual duty becomes that act which 
one believes has the greatest claim upon him at the moment.l5 
Ross suggests the following division of prima facie duties:16 
(1) Duties resting on one's previous acts. These are of two kinds. 
(a) There are duties of fidelity, resting upon promises or implicit 
promises. (b) There are also duties of reparation, resting on a previous 
wrong act. (2) Duties of gratitude (the returning of services, irrespective 
of motive) resting upon previous acts of other men (services done by them 
to the agent) .• (3) Duties of justice, resting upon the possible distribution 
of pleasure or hapoiness not in accordance with merit. In these oases it is 
our duty to upset or prevent such a distribution. (4) Duties of beneficence 
rest upon the fact that there are people in the world whose virtue, 
intelligence, or pleasure could be made better. (5) Duties resting upon the 
fact that we could improve our own virtue or intelligence are duties of 
self-improvement. (6) Finally, the duties of non-maleficence are those 
that can be summed up under the title of 'not injuring others•. These are 
more stringent than the duties of beneficence, being the first step on the 
way to the recognition of the duties of beneficence. 
These duties do not in any way refer to certain states of motivation. 
It is not our duty, holds Ross, to h&Ye certain motives, but to do certain 
15see ~., PP• 19-20, 28. See also Ross, Foundations, pp. 82-86. 
16see Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 20-22. 
46 
acts. This catalogue of the main types ot duty rests upon no one 
logical principle. Each of these types of duty rests upon certain circum-
st~nces (e. g., having made a promise or having done a wrong) which 
cannot, on reflection, be reduced to a single type of circumstance or 
to a single principle. However, an attempt can be made at a more systematic 
arrangement of the main types of duty. (l) It is a prima facie duty to 
bring into existence things that are intrinsically good, these things 
being virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. If this be so, then the duty of 
beneficence and the duty of self-t.provement rest on the same ground. 
But there is also a complex intrinsic good, which consists in the pro-
portionment of happiness to virtue. Thus, the duty of justice also 
comes under the general principle that we should produce as much good 
as possible. (2) The duties of reparation and gratitude are special 
obligations which arise incidentally from acts which, though not meant 
to create such obligations, do so anyway. (3) Finally, duties of promise-
keeping are special obligations that arise from acts whose intentions are 
to create obligations.17 
In the case of conflicting pri.a facie duties, no general rules can 
be laid down for estimating their comparative stringency. 
We can only say that a great deal of stringency belongs to the duties 
of 'perfect obligation' -- the duties of keeping our promises, of 
repairing wrongs we hawe done, and of returniqg the ~ivalent of 
, r .a , , , 
services we have received. For the rest, El' r't'- ~t D'"E< ')'( lrf< a-c..r. 
This sense of our particular duty in particular circumstances, precedea 
and informed by the fullest reflection we~can bestow on the act in all 
its bearings! is highly fallible, but it is the only guide we have 
to our duty. 6 
17 See ibid., PP• 22-27. 
16~., PP• 41-42. 
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Although Ross does not want to ground rightness on goodness (as 
the utilitarians do), and although/~~o~~htness is not completely 
definable, he does think that it is a complex characteristic (of acts) 
which includes in it the generic quality of suitability. The root idea 
of rightness is suitability to the situation -- fitness, in a certain 
specific and unanalysable way, to a certain situation. However, rightness 
is to be identified "• • • neither with any and every degree of suitability, 
nor with complete suitability, but only with the greatest amount of 
suitability possible in the circumstances.nl9 Thus, we can begin to 
define moral rightness by saying that it is a form of suitability. 
"• • • But we cannot complete the definition, since if we ask what kind 
of suitability it is we can only say that it is the kind of suitability 
that is rightness.n20 
Having examined Ross's theory of duties, we move now to a consideration 
of the criticism that has been leveled against his theory. 
c. Criticism of Ross's Theory or Duties 
1. Teleological Elements in Ross's Theory 
Although Ross strongly criticizes teleological theories which hold 
that one's moral obligation depends entirely on the intrinsic worth of 
the actual or expected results of the acts which one might perform, his 
type of formalism contains important teleological elements. 
It was noted above that Ross holds that it is a prima facie duty 
to bring into existence things that are intrinsically good. We shall see 
19Ross, Foundations, p. 53. 
20rbid., p. 55. See also PP• 51-55, 79-82, 164-65. In the latter 
referenc~ss uses the term "harmony" in place of suitability. 
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later in this chapter that Ross argues for three comparatively simple 
intrinsic goods (virtue, knowledge, and pleasure) and one more complex 
good (the proportionment of happiness to virtue). Thus, it is one's 
prima ~ duty to bring into existence these intrinsic goods. It was 
also noted above that three of Ross's six prima facie duties fall under 
this general obligation to produce as much good as possible. These are 
the duties of benevolence, self-improvement, and justice. There is one 
other prima facie duty that is related to the general obligation to 
produce good. This is the duty of non-maleficence, which rests upon the 
fact that we ought, prima facie, not to bring things that are bad in them-
selves upon others.21 
Besides the general obligation to produce as much good as possible, 
there remains the special obligations of reparation, gratitude, and 
promise-keeping. And, according to Ross, the reasons for knowing that 
these duties rest upon us (the facts that we have inflicted injuries on 
others, accepted benefits from others, and made promises to others) 
are not reducible to the general obligation to produce as much good as 
possible.22 
2. A Chaos of Unrelated Prima Facie Duties 
Ther• being no single principle to which these several special 
obligations can be reduced, a common criticism of Ross's view is that 
it leaves us with a chaos of unrelated and unexplained prima facie duties. 
This brings up again the old battle between Ockham 1s razor and Butler's 
"everything is what it is and not another thing". But even if we would 
2lsee Ross, The Right !nd the Good, pp. 24-27. 
22see ~., P• 24. 
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decide in favor of Ockham1 s razor, the utilitarian critic has only 
pushed the explanation a stage further back in giving as an ultimate 
reason for actions that they are all productive of good (or avert evil). 
For even the utilitarian would have to admit an ultimate variety of 
intrinsic goods. Is this any better than admitting an ultimate variety 
of prima facie duties? To be sure there are no general rules available 
for weighing different conflicting prima ~ duties against each other. 
But neither are there general rules available for balancing the different 
goods and evils of the utilitarian against each other. 23 
However, such an ~ hominem reply would not satisf.y a person like 
Brand Blanshard. Says Blanshard, 
Just as we must believe that there is some common character that 
makes true beliefs true, so we are constrained to believe t~~t 
there;ts some common character that makes right acts right. 
Blanshard admits that this belief may be am illusion, but he has 
"• • • an 'invincible surmise' that there is more to the story than 
an •unconnected heap' of duties. • • .n25 Even if there is a lack of 
common nature among good things, the utilita:cian has the "• •• more 
intellectually satisfYing case.n26 For the deontologist doubles the 
pluralism of the utilitarian by holding that there is no common nature 
in what is right as well as in what is good.27 
The argument has reached an impasse. Ross would just claim that 
Blanshard's •invincible surmise' !! an illusion. However, one deontologist, 
23see ibid., p. 23. See also A. c. Ewing, The Definition of Good 
(New York: The'""iaclllillan c., 1957), PP• 202-o3. 
24Brand Blanshard, Reason and Goodness (London: George Allen and 
Unwin, Ltd., 1961), P• 154. 
2Srbid. 26rbid. 
27see ~., PP• 153-SS. 
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A. c. Ewing, would not be satisfied with his position unless he could 
in principle bring the prima facie duties into some kind of system. For 
Ewing, there is not enough rational explanation or justification in Ross•s 
theory. Ewing admits two criteria in ethics, self-evidence and coherence. 
He holds that the different prima raoie duties confirm and support e~ch 
other, allowing for explanation within a coherent system. Such a system 
in ethics would be similar to that envisaged in the coherence theory of 
truth. For Ewing the fulfillment of one prima facie duty tends to the 
fulfillment of others and the violation of one tends to the violation of 
others. A problem arises in the case of clashes that occur at times between 
different prima facie duties. Ewing thinks that most of these clashes are 
the result of wrongdoing on the part of someone. And if prima facie duties 
constitute a coherent system, we would expect that a violation of one 
would tend to lead to situations in which they clashed. But there are 
cases in which clashes of prima facit duties are not the result of violations 
(e. g., the case of lying to keep an invalidfibm hearing bad news or the 
case of saving the life of one's child rather than the lives of two 
strangers in an earthquake). The fact that cases like these exist weakens 
considerably the explanation in term. of coherence.28 
So the most we can say is that in general and on principle the 
rrima facie duties fit together, that to fulfil one tends, of its 
trinsic nature, to fulfil others, and to violate one tends to the 
violation of other.. But this much we can say, and this helps to 
confirm the belief that any one of them is a genuine prima facie 
duty.29 
28see Ewing, "Recent Developments in British Ethical Thought,• in 
c. A. Mace, ed., British Philoso by in the Mid-centur (London: George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 19 1 , PP• 1 -19. See also Ewing, The Definition of 
~~ PP• 203-11. 
29Ewing, The Definition of Good, p. 206. 
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Ross certainly would want to say that the prima facie duties fit 
together in the sense that they do not contradict one another. But it 
remains an open question whether he would want to say that the fulfillment 
of one prima facie duty tends, of its intrinsic nature, to fulfill others. 
Once, however, one accepts the view that the prima facie duties need to 
be brought together into some kind of system, the attempt at rational 
explanation in terms of coherence seems to be the most rationally adequate 
approach. 
). Is the Concept Of ~ _Fa~c~i~e Duties Secondary? 
It has been argued th~t Ross's concept of prima facie duties is 
secondary, presupposing the concept of absolute duty. Thus, it should 
not be regarded as an ultimate concept in ethics. This objection is 
based upon a misunderstanding of what Ross means by a prima ~ duty. 
A prima facie duty, for Ross, is a dutyper.!! which rests upon a definite 
circumstance which has definite moral significance. A prima ~facie duty is 
one's actual duty in all circumstances except in the situation where there 
is a conflict of such pri~ facie duties. In cases of conflict, one of these 
prima facie duties becomes an actual duty; but the other prima facie duties 
are not forgotten or discarded. For example, if one breaks a promise to do 
a benevolent act, he is not completely relieved from the duty of keeping 
the promise. He is still obligated to adopt an attitude of approval toward 
the duty of keepin8 the promise; and when he breaks the promise in favor 
of another duty, he at least regrets his breach of faith and, if possible, 
explains the situation to the promisee and attempts to make it up to him 
in other ways. Absolute rightness, then, is not the sw. of a number of 
features in acts (each feature entailing a erima facie duty); it is the 
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resultant of a number of features in acts. The primary ethical intuition, 
for Ross, is of parti-resultant duties and not of toti-resultant duties.JO 
Thus far in this chapter we have examined only one aspect of Ross's 
normative ethics, his theory of duties. There remains for our study Ross's 
theory of the good. 
D. Things Good in Themselves 
It is important that a student of ethics give attention to the nature 
of goodness. This is true because a great part of our duty (utilitarians 
would say the whole of our duty) is to bring what is good into existence. 
As a matter of fact, where no other special duty is involved, it is our 
duty just to produce as much good as we can. In this section Ross•s theory 
about the things that are good ~themselves will be examined. By 'good in 
itself' Ross means something that is 'intrinsically good' or 1good apart 
from its results•, not something which is •useful as a means to what is 
good in itself'• Goodness, for Ross, as well as rightness, is a simple, 
unanalyzable quality of certain acts, dispositions, and persons; it too 
is grasped by intuitive insight.31 
For Ross, the following kinds of thing are intrinsically good: 
(1) Virtuous disposition and action is intrinsically good, being 
• • • action, or disposition to act, from any one of certain motives, 
of which at all events the most notable are the desire to do one's 
duty, the desire to bring into being something that is good, and the 
desire to give pleasure or save pain to others. It seems clear that 
30see Ross, The Right and the Good, PP• 19-20. See also Ewing, 
"Recent Developments in British Ethical Thought," PP• 79-80. 
3lsee Ross, Foundations, PP• 252-57. 
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we regard all such actions and dispositions as having value in 
themselves apart from any consequence.J2 
(2) Pleasure is good in itself. However, pleasure differs from virtuous 
disposition and action. We cannot say of pleasure that it is always good 
and of pain that it is always bad. Undeserved pleasure may make for an 
overall state of badness, while deserved pain may make for an overall 
state of goodness. Pleasure has a property analogous to that of prima facie 
rightness. While an act of promise-keeping may be a prima facie duty, it is 
an actual duty only if the act has no other morally significant character-
istics (e. g., causing great suffering to another). Analogously, a state 
of pleasure is good if the state has neither the characteristic of being 
contrary to desert nor the characteristic of being the realization of a 
bad disposition. 
Thus the pleasures of which we can say without doubt that they are 
good are (i) the pleasures of non-moral beings (animals), (ii) the 
pleasures of moral beings that are deserved or are either realizations 
of good moral dispositions or realizations of neutral capacities 
(such as the pleasures of the senses).JJ 
(J) Along with virtue and pleasure a third independent good is "• •• the 
apportionment of pleasure and pain to the virtuous and vicious 
respectively.n34 (4) Knowledge (and in a less degree right opinion) are 
states of mind good in themselves. Knowledge of mere matters of fact, 
without knowledge of their relation to other facts, might seem to be 
worthless. However, on reflection, thinks Ross, it seems clear that right 
opinion is better than being wrong and knowledge better than right opinion, 
even about unrelated matters of fact. Against the argument that some pieces 
32Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 134. 
3Jrbid., P• 138. 
34Ibid • 
.......... 
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of knowledge are not good {e. g., a sick man's knowledge of how ill he 
is), it can be maintained that it is the consequences of the knowledge 
and not the knowledge itself that is thought to be bad.35 
These four goods seem to be for Ross intrinsically good. Anything 
that is intrinsically good is either one of these or a combination of 
two or more of them. For example, aesthetic enjoyment is a blend of 
pleasure with insight into the nature of its object. Similarly, mutual 
love seems to be a blend of virtuous disposition, knowledge, and pleasure. 
Similar analyses may be applied to all complex goods.36 
Boss has arrived at this list of goods by an appeal to the moral 
consciousness, by reflecting on what we really think to be good. qe is 
willing to rest his case upon the findings of the moral consciousness. 
However, he thinks his list of goods might derive some support from the 
fact that it harmonizes with the classification of the elements of the 
life of the soul into cognition, feeling, and conation. Knowledge is the 
ideal state of the mind on the cognitive side, pleasure on the feeling 
side, and virtue on the conative side. And the ideal relation between 
the conative and feeling sides is that of the distribution of happiness 
to virtue.37 
For Ross, there are no intrinsic goods which are not states of mind 
or relations between states of mind. 
It might of course be objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods 
that are not states of mind or relations between states of mind at all, 
but in this suggestion I can find no plausibility.38 
A universe from which mind was entirely absent would have nothing in it 
35see ~., PP• 134-41. 
37see ~., p. 140. 
36see ibid., P• 141. 
38Ibid. 
that one could call good in itself. However, the existence of a material 
universe may be a necessary condition for the existence or things that are 
good in themselves. But the value of material things is instrumental and 
not intrinsic.39 
The question arises as to whether Ross would want to say that persons 
~ persons are intrinsically good. He does hold that certain states of mind 
(certain moral dispositions and actions, and certain activities or the intellect 
and of the creative imagination) are good in the sense that they are fine or 
admirable activities of the human spirit and that they are good in such a way 
that anyone who, ·has them is to that extent being good himself .40 Thus, it is 
persons who experience these states of mind who are intrinsically good. However, 
although those persons who possess certain characteristics are intrinsically 
good, persons qua persons are not to be included among intrinsic goods. If 
persons qua persons were intrinsicall7 good, then persons without certain 
moral dispositions (e. g., conscientiousness and benevolence) would be good 
in themselves (E!!_ !!,)• This, it seems, Ross would want to deny. 
It was noted above that a great part of one's duty is to bring what is 
good into existence. According to Ross, where no other special duty is 
involved, it is our duty to produce as auoh good as we can. One ~roduces 
as much good as he can by bringing into existence intrinsic goods. However, 
39see ibid., pp. lLo-41. 
4°see Ross, Foundations, p. 283. Ross thinks it best to call those 
individuals who have or do these admirable activities "admirable" instead 
of "good", since 'good' as applied to men tends to be limited to moral 
goodness. See ibid., P• 271 •. 
if some goods are to be valued more (or higher) than others, then the 
bringing of ~ into existence would produce the ~ good. This 
consideration leads us to a study of the possibility of arranging things 
that are intrinsically good in a hierarahy of goods in terms of degrees 
of goodness. 
E. Degrees of Goodness 
The major question faced here is the question of whether goods 
are commensurable (that is, capable of being exactly measured by the 
same number, quantity, or measure). This question breaks down into two 
sub-questions: (1) Are goods of the same order commensurable (e. g., one 
state of knowledge with another state of knowledge)? (2) Are goods of 
different types commensurable (e. g., pleasure in respect of goodness 
against virtue or knowledge)? The question of the commensurability of 
goods of the same order will be considered first. 
1. Pleasures 
There seems to be no doubt, thinks Ross, that pleasures are 
comparable. They have the only characteristic that is necessary to com-
parability, which is difference of intensity. It may be that an observer 
or experieai cannot observe thi difference of intensity between two 
pleasures. This only proves that the conditions on our side which would 
enable us to compare them are often lacki~g.4l 
Pleasures are comparable (b. terms of intensity) but are they 
commensurable (in terms of one pleasure being, for example, twice as 
intense as another)? That they are commensurable seems to follow from 
41see Ross, The Right and the Good, P• 142. 
the fact that they are comparable. For if one pleasure is more intense 
than another, it should have a definite degree of extra intensity. When 
we cannot commeasure pleasures, the lack is on our side and not on theirs.42 
The pleasures have precise intensities, which in principle, make them 
commensurable. But they have not the characteristics that make 
material objects comparatively easy to measure, the characteristics 
of being fairly permanent and of being easily compared with standards 
of measurement which may be applied to each in turn.43 
When we turn to the attempt actually to measure pleasures against 
ea«h other, another characteristic other than intensity enters into our 
calculations. This is the characteristic of duration. Intensity and 
duration are the only characteristics on which depend the value of a 
pleasure ~pleasure.44 
It is to be noted that Bentham enumerated five other "dimensions" 
(fecundity, purity, certainty, propinquity, and extension) on which depend 
the calculus of pleasures. However, fecundity and purity do not refer to 
the intrinsic value of pleasures but to their tendency to produce other 
pleasures. lxtension does not refer to the intrinsic value of a particular 
pleasure, but to the number of people who will get pleasure from a 
particular act. And certainty and propinquity do not belong to pleasures 
in themselves.45 
2. States of Knowledge 
In practice some forms of knowledge are treated as more valuable 
than others, but they may be valued either for their own nature or for 
their results. The concern here is only with their intrinsic value as 
being good in themselves and not in the value of their results. 
42see ~., PP• 142-43. 
44see ibid., p. 145. 
.......... 
43Ibid., P• 143. 
4Ssee ~., PP• 144-45 • 
Ross holds that knowledge is superior to right opinion since it is 
wholly the apprehension of fact and involves certainty and complete 
absence of doubt. Right opinion is partly grounded on apprehension of fact 
and partly the product of other psychical events (e. g., wishes or hopes), 
and it never approaches certainty.46 
Knowledge of general principles is intellectually more valuable than 
knowledge of isolated matters of fact. This is the case, for Ross, because 
the ideal in the pursuit of knowledge is system. The more general the 
principle one has knowledge of, the more facts it is capable of explaining, 
and thus the better the knowledga.47 
The intrinsic value of a state of knowledge or opinion seems, 
then, to depend on three elements: 
(i) the degree of its groundedness on fact, (ii) the degree to which 
the strength of conviction with which it is held corresponds to its 
groundedn,§s, (iii) the generality or the fact known, or believed 
to exist.4H 
As to how these three factors are to be, .. balanced against one another in 
r/ knowlede:e estimating the value of any particula or op1nron, Ross confesses ignorance. 
However, he thinks the question is practically of little importance, for 
in choosing a subject of study one does not try to estimate the value of 
what he is likely to gain but follows his strongest interests. And, for 
Ross, to follow one's strongest interests is to fulfill the most important 
condition of gaining anything valuable at al1.49 
One might object to Ross's claim that knowledge of general principles 
is more valuable than knowledge of matters of fact. Knowledge of particular 
matters of fact (e. g., knowledge of the character of the people that one 
46see ~., PP• 146-47. 
48rbid., P• 148. 
47
see ~., PP• 147-48. 
49see ~., PP• 148-49. 
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lives among) is usually more important to our welfare than knowledge 
of many general principles (e. g., highly general mathematical principles). 
However, the value of this knowledge is an instrumental value. Ross is 
concerned here only with the intrinsic value of knowledge. And for hi~, 
generality is the only valuable element in knowledge (or opinion) that 
arises from the nature of the fact apprehended (or believed in). 
). Moral Goodness 
For Ross, only virtuous dispositions and actions are morally good. 
By 'morally good' Ross means 'good either by being a certain sort of 
character or by being related in one of cartain definite ways to a 
certain sort of charactert.SO It may be said that a certain~ is 
morally good or that a certain action or a certain sort of feeling 
(e. g., sympathy with suffering) is morally good. A man is morally good 
by virtue of having a character of a certain kind, and an action or 
feeling is morally good by virtue of proceeding from a character of a 
certain kind. While conscientious action is morally good (since it is 
good in virtue of proceeding from a certain sort of character}, knowledge 
and pleasure are iood (being good, not in virtue of proceeding from a 
certain sort of character but in virtue of being, respectively, knowledge 
and pleasure).Sl 
Before virtuous dispositions and actions can be balanced against 
one another, it must be determined just ~ dispositions and actions 
are virtuous (or morally good). It is generally agreed among moralists, 
thinks Ross, that disposition and action owe their goodness, and the 
measure of their goodness, to the motives from which they spring. Ross 
Slsee ibid. 
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uses the terms "motives" and "desires" interchangeably in this context. 
Thus, for example, sympathy at the misfortune of others could be described 
as springing from either the motive or the desire ::that they should be 
happy.52 
After ~onsidering the various kinds of motive from which action can 
spring, Ross attempts to classify them in "order of excellence" (or in order 
of worth or value).HeecoDCludes that there are three motives from which 
morally good actions flow. These are, in order of descending value, (1) the 
desire to do one's duty (i. e., the desire to do an act as being the ful-
fillment of a moral claim or, in other words, the desire to do an act as 
being an act one ought to do), (2) the desire to bring into being some 
good activity or some improvement of character or intellect, and (3) the 
desire to produce some pleasure for another being.53 
Aceording to Ross each of these motives or desires has a more 
particularized form and a more generalized form. Thus, the desire to do 
one's duty can be broken down into (a) the desire to fulfill some par-
ticular claim (which is prima facie obligatory) and (b) the desire to do 
the act which is the maximum fulfilbaent of claims and is in the strict 
sense obligatory (i. e., an absolute duty). The desire to bring something 
into being because it is good breaks down~into (a) the desire for some 
particular good activity or for the attainment of some particular virtue, 
knowledge, or skill, and (b) the generalized desire for good activity.54 
52see ~., pp. 156-57. See also Ross, Foundations, p. 293. 
53see Ross, Foundations, PP• 302-o3. See also Ross, The Right and the 
~~ P• 160. 
54This latter ia the motive which Aristotle describes as dominating 
the good man, and it is also the motive in what T. H. Green describes 
as the life of self-realization. 
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The desire to produce pleasure breaks down into (a) the desire that 
particular people should have particular pleasures and (b) the desire 
for the pleasure of all human beings. According to Ross, the generalized 
form of each of these motives is to be valued higher than the particularized 
form.5.5 
The question arises as to whether any moral value attaches to the 
desire to get some particular pleasure !or oneself. In this regard Ross 
divides pleasures into three classes --
•• • those which are marks of a good nature, and themselves morally 
good, such as the pleasure of helping another; those which are morally 
indifferent, such as the sensuous pleasures; and those which are marks 
of a bad nature, and themselves morally bad, such as the pleasure of 
hurting another • .56 
For Ross, only the desire to get a morally good pleasure, !! being morally 
good, is itself morally good. All the other desires to get some particular 
pleasure for oneself are either morally indifferent or morally bad. rhe 
generalized wish to get a maximum of pleasure for oneself is morally 
neutral.S7 
As to the wishes to promote perfection or good activity in another 
person and to achieve it for oneself, Ross finds no ground for regarding 
either as better or less good than the other. In either case one is 
desiring something to come into being because it is good; thus, thinks 
Ross, both desires are of tae same moral worth.S8 
Ross holds that the desire to do one's duty, either in its 
particularized or in its generalized form, ranks above all other motives. 
Suppose, for example, suggests Ross, that a person thinks of a certain 
.5.5see Ross, Foundations, PP• 296-300 • 
.56n,id., P•, 302. .57see ibid • 
.58see ~., PP• 302-o3. 
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use of his money as the fulfillment of a moral claim that a creditor has 
on him while at the same time he is attracted toward bestowing the same 
money in charity. As long as the person thinks of the payment of the debt 
as an act he ought to do and the act of charity as not being something 
he ought to do, we are bound to say, holds Ross, that he will be acting 
better in doing the former than in doing the latter. Only if the person 
thinks that the object of his charity has a moral claim on him could he 
be acting better by giving to charity than by paying the debt. However, 
this is no longer the contrasting of an action from the sense of duty with 
an action from a different motive. It is the· contrasting of an action from 
the sense of one prima facie duty with an action from the sense of another 
prima facie duty.59 
Persons have characters that are morally good when their actions 
flow trom the desire to do one's duty or from the desire for the coming 
into existence of some good or f~om the desire to produce pleasures in 
another or others. However, human action often flows from a combination 
of motives. What can be said of the worth of such combinations of motives? 
Suppose motive X is better than motive Y. Is an action from motives I and 
Y morally better than or worse than or equal to one done from the better 
motive I only? For example, is an act done partly from a 1ense of duty and 
partly from a desire to do someone good morally better or worse or equal 
to an act done wholly from a sense of duty? 
Ross holds that the cooperation of another motive with the motive 
of duty does not diminish the strength of the motive o! duty. The addition 
of a morally indifferent motive (e. g., the desire of an innocent sensuous 
pleasure) to the motive of duty does not lessen the value of the action 
59see ~., PP• 303-04. 
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that flows from these desires. The addition of a less good motive (e. g., 
the desire to produce pleasure in another) to the motive of duty increases 
the value of the action that fiows from them. The sense of duty may be 
present with equal intensity and effectiveness whether another motive is 
or is not effective.60 
There are actions in which the sense of duty plus an inferior good 
motive are just enough to secure the doing of the act. In these cases, 
holds Ross, the value of the action, and the value of the character from 
which the action flows, are reduced. However, Ross suggests that there are 
other cases in which, even when an inferior good motive is present, the 
sense of duty is strong enough to have secured by itself the doing of the 
act. In this latt.er case, the valuees of the action and of the character 
from which the action flows are greater than if the action had been done 
from duty alone. The more the good motives that cooperate with the motive 
of duty, the greater the value o.f the character which has these motives. 
Says Ross., 
• • • we can think of the ideally good man as having many good 
motives in addition to the sense of duty, but with a sense of 
duty strong enough to induge him to do his duty even if the 
other motives were absent.ol 
4. Pleasure, Knowledge, and Moral Goodness 
We have considered the question of the commensurability of goods 
of the same order. The question before us now is whether goods of 
different types (virtue, knowledge, and pleasure) are commensurable. 
60see ibid., PP• 305-o6. See also Ross, The Right and the Good, 
PP• 168-72. -
61Ross, Foundations, p. 306. See also Ross, The Right and the 
~~ PP• 172-~3. 
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The sense in which pleasure is good poses a preliminary problem. 
It would seem that pleasures are not good in the same 1enae in which 
moral dispositions and actions are good. There is nothing admirable or 
commendable in the feeling of pleasure, but there is in moral dispositions 
and actions. Nor is a man good in respect of the fact that he is feeling 
pleasure, though he is good in respect of certain moral dispositions and 
actions. Further, although there is a prima facie obligation to produce 
something that is good, there are cases in which we are under no prima facie 
obligation to produce pleasure. We feel no prima ~ obligation either 
(1) to produce pleasures that are the manifestation of a bad mor•l nature 
or (2) to produce pleasures for ourselves. Finally, it seems to be the case 
that the goodness of pleasure is never good enough to outweigh the badness 
of immorality.62 
In the light of these considerations, it seems that we would be unable 
to equate, in terms of goodness, amounts of pleasure with amounts of 
morally good action. In The Right and the Good Ross holds that, although 
the smallest amount of virtue is greater in value than the greatest amount 
of pleasure, both virtue and pleasure have places on the smae scale of 
goodness.63 But if they are on the same scale, then it would be possible 
for pleasure of a certain great intensity to outweigh in value a certain 
virtue. However, Ross does not think that this is ever the case. In 
Foundations of Ethics Ross retracts his previous view, maintaining that 
pleasures are good in a different sense from that in which moral dispositions 
and good activities are good.64 Ross puts his position on the matter 
62see Ross, Foundations, pp. 271-7$~ 
63Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 150. 
64Ross, Foundations, p. 275. 
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thus: 
Certain moral dispositions and actions, and certain activities of the 
intellect and of the creative imagination, a~pear to be good in a way 
which depends entirely on their intrinsic nature, on the first being 
conscientious or benevolent, for instance, or on the second being 
logical or having the characters, harder to specify, that makes 
artistic activity good. These things are good in a sense which is 
indefinable, but which ,ay be paraphrased by saying that they are 
fine or admirable activities of the human spirit, and by adding that 
they are good in such a way that any one who has them or does them 
is to that extent being good himself. Pleasure is never good in this, 
which I should call the most proper sense of 'good•. But the pleasures 
of others (except those which are immoral) are good in a secondary sense, 
viz. that they are morally worthy or suitable objects of satisfaction. 
Things that are good in the first and most proper sense we have, by a 
self-evident necessity, a pfimh facie duty to produce, to the best of 
our ability, irrespective o wether it is ourselves or others that are 
going to have or do them. Things that are good in the secondary sense, 
i. e., the pleasures of others, are also things that we have a duty to 
produce.6S 
If these are really two different senses of good ( good as a worthy 
object of admiration when referring to certain moral dispositions and 
actions and certain activities of the intellect and of the creative imagi-
nation; good as a worthy object of satisfaction when referring to the pleasures 
of others), then things that are good in these different senses do not 
fall, according to Ross, on the same scale of goodness and, thus, are not 
comparable in respect of goodness.66 
Ross holds that this recognition of two senses of goodness vindicates 
the natural moral consciousness. For the natural moral consciousness finds 
it very difficult to believe that any amount of pleasure can outweigh a 
given virtue or activity of the intellect in goodness.67 
Virtue and knowledge, however, are comparable with one another. 
Ross is inclined to believe that moral goodness is infinitely better 
65Ibid., pp~ 282-83. 
66see ibid., P• 283. 
67see ~., PP• 27$, 283. 
valuationally than knowledge. No increase of knowledge, for Ross, is 
worth having at the cost of a wilful failure to do one's duty or of a 
deterioration of character. This is not to deny that intellectual integ-
rity (i. e., the love of truth for its own sake) is among the most salient 
elements in a good moral character. That which is less good than virtue 
is not the intellectual life in its concreteness but the mere being in 
possession of knowledge irrespective of the character from which this 
knowledge springs. Virtue, holds Ross, is also superior to the complex 
good that consists of the proportion.ent of pleasure to virtue.68 
F. Hierarchy of Goods 
In the light of the above exposition of Ross's theory of goods an 
attempt is now made to list Ross's hierarchy of goods, in descending 
importance in terms of value. The scheme is far from complete, listing, 
with the exception of the apportionment of pleasure and pain to the virtuous 
and vicious respectively and of creative imagination, only "pure goods" 
and not complex goods. Ross himself does not list any complex goods other 
than these two exceptions. However, he does say that whatever these complex 
goods might be they will be compounded of the three elements,virtue, 
knowledge, and pleasure.69 
Here follows the bi*rarchy of goods suggested by Ross's analysis: 
1. Moral goodness 
a. the character disposed to act from a sense of duty plus all 
other relevant good desires (having the attractions and ---
aversions toward all actions that an ideally good man 
would have) 
b. the character disposed to act from a sense of duty plus 
~ other relevant good desires 
68see ~., P• 264. See also Ross, The Right and the Good, pp. 152-54. 
69see Ross, The Right and the Good, P• 141. 
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c. the character disposed to act always from a sense of duty 
d. the char~cter disposed to act from a sense of duty in respect 
to some prima facie duties 
e. the character disposed to act from the desire to promote the 
moral and intellect'&! improvement of himself or others 
f. the char~cter disposed to act from the desire to produce 
pleasures (which are not immoral) for others 
2. Knowledge 
a. of general principles 
b. of isolated matters of fact 
3. (?) Creative imagination (or aesthetic enjoyment): insight into 
the nature of an object plus pleasure 
4. Right opinion 
a. about general principles 
b. about isolated matters of fact 
5. Apportionment of pleasure and pain to the virtuous and vicious 
respectively 
6. Pleasure 
a. in moral beings in harmony with desert and as the realization 
of a good disposition 
b. in non-moral beings (animals) 
G. The Relation of Moral Goodness and Rightness 
Ross's theory of duties contains important teleological elements.7° 
According to him, one has a general obligation (which is a prima· ~ duty) 
to bring into existence as much good as possible. Thus, one has a general 
obligation to bring into existence (1) virtue, knowledge, and pleasure in 
othersJ (2) virtue and knowledge in ones•lf; and (3) the proportionment 
of happiness to virtue in all men. 
70see supra, p. 47. 
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Since virtue (moral goodness or character) is to be valued higher 
than all other goods, it is the thing best worth aiming at in ooeself 
and best worth trying to promote in others. It is that which we are 
obligated to bring into existence above all else (except in a situation 
where a special obligation, for example, the prima facie duty to keep a 
promise, is ooasidered to be more binding). 
However, moral goodness and rightness are more closely related than 
for just the reason that it is one's general duty to bring moral goodness 
into existence. (1) On the one hand, only the person whose character is 
such that he is disposed always to act from a sense of duty (plus all other 
relevant desires) can be completely morally good. (2) And, on the other 
hand, it is only the morally good person (who is sensitive to all the 
prima ~ obligations involved in a given situation) who will do with 
any degree of probability right acts • 
• • • goodness of character is the::only condition that with even the 
slightest degree of probability tends to make for the doing of right 
acts. If a man is not morally good, it is only by the merest accident 
that he ever does what he ought. The act to which he is attracted by 
one feature of it, itself morally indifferent or bad, may be the act 
towards which a good man would be attracted by its whole system of 
morally si~ficant features, but if it is so, the coincidence is 
accidental.71 
Thus, a theory such as Ross's which insists on the difference and mutual 
independence of rightness and goodness is not precluded from recognizing 
the important connections between the two.72 
In this chapter Ross's normative ethical theory has been studied. 
One major aspect of this theory is the theory of duties (or obligations). 
To have moral obligations is to be morally responsible for the doing of 
71Ross, Foundations, P• 310. 
72see ~., PP• 166, 308-10. 
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some acts and for the not doing of other acts. Moral responsibility 
would seem to imply moral freedom, the freedom to choose between 
alternative courses of action that action which one believes to be 
that which he ought to do. But does mtral responsibility imply free-
. -
will? Could individuals be held morally responsible for their actions 
in a deterministic world? It is the problem of free-will vs. determinism, 
as this problem is handled in Rose's ethical theory, that we are now led 
to examine. 
v. 
FREE-WILL VS. DETERMINISM 
IN ROSS'S ETHICAL THEORY 
In this chapter we shall examine in detail Ross's determinism. Then 
we shall offer what we consider to be the view that best harmonizes with 
(1) the reports of the moral consciousness and (2) the idea of moral 
responsibility. Before beginning we must note that Ross is not satisfied 
with his solution of the problem. However, although he thinks that he has 
failed to adequately solve the problem, he definitely takes a stand for 
determinism.1 
A. R.oss 'a Theory 
It is Ross's contention that empirical evidence can never establish 
either determinism or indeterminism. This conviction is based upon the facts 
(1) of the inadequacy of our powers of observation and measurement and (2) 
of the nature of the law of causation. The law of causation may be formulated 
in different ways. Ross formulates it thus: "• •• 1 for every variation 
between two events, there must be some variation between the antecedent 
circumstances, without with the variation between the events would not 
have existedt.n2 In order to prove the law in this form one's experiences 
lsee Ross, Foundations, P• 328. 
2~., P• 214. 
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would have had to cover not only all past events but also those that 
are still in the future. Also, since all one can say on the basis of 
experience is, at the most, that no variation has been observed, the 
law cannot be disproved by experience either. But further, the law cannot 
even be confirmed by experience. Experience might verif.y the existence 
of a variation in previous conditions but it cannot show us that without 
it the variation in the present events could not have occurred·.3 "In other 
words, while experience can prove the existence of a constant conjunction 
within the limits of the experience, it can never discover the existence 
of a necessity; only reason or insight can do that.n4 
Thus, Ross treats the ! priori argument for determinism as by far 
the most important. Ross's argument takes the following form:5 
(1) If everything else in the world up to a certain date ha~ been 
the same, and yet S (a subject or substance) had been in a 
different state from that in which it was, S would have had to 
have a different nature from that which it had; 
(2} but S had not a different nature from that which it had; 
(3) therefore, everything else being as it was, S could not have 
been in a different s)ate from that in which it was. 
Putting it simply, the question with Ross is whether or not we are certain 
that there must be something to account for each event's happening precisely 
as it does. 
The determinist is in fact saying that the question whether S is at a 
certain moment to be in one state or in another must depend on some-
(hing, and that if it does not depend on anything else in the universe 
x h~othesi it does not, since everything else is sunposed to be 
the same , it must depend on something in s. And this is surely as 
self-evident as anything could be.6 
Ross, although playing down the role of experience in confirming the 
law of caus~ion, thinks that experience does in a sense ("in ~ Pickwickian 
3see ibid., PP• 212-14. 4Ibid., p. 214. 
5see ~., PP• 208-09. 6Ibid., P• 209. 
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sense") confirm or vindicate it. In the first place, the entire progress 
of science has depended on the assumption that the precise form of ever.y 
event has a precise cause; and the history of science has vindicated this 
assumption. But, secondly, experience confirms the law of causation in a 
negative sense; for, in finding a variation in the conditions answering 
to a variation in the events, the determinist diminishes the number of 
instances on Which the indeterminist might rely.7 
Since there is this sense in which experience either confirms (or 
disconfirms) the law of causation, Ross examines the principle of indetermin-
acy, some interpretations of which have led some physicists to doubt or 
deny the universality of the law of oausation. Basically, the phenomena 
with regard to the behavior of electrons which has led some physicists 
to accept indeterminism are as follows: it cannot be said of an electron 
that it has a certain momentum and direction at point B as a result of 
having a certain momentum and direction at point A because the conditions 
of observation are such that, when they allow us to fix the position 
exactly, they make it impossible to fix the momentum exactly, and vice 
versa.8 
There are three different meanings that can be given of the experience 
that an electron has not at any given moment both a determinate position 
and a determinate momentum. (1) It could be taken to mean only that science 
is not !! ~ present able to give definite values to both the position 
and the momentum of electrons. (2) It could be taken to mean that the 
electrons have a position and a momentum, but that these are not definite. 
7see ~., PP• 213-14. 
8For an excellent discussion of this physical phenomena see the 
articles by Bridgman, Lande, Blanshard, and Hook in Sidney Hook, ed., 
Determinism and Freedom (New York: New York University Press, 1958). 
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(3) It could be taken to mean that, although electrons have definite 
positions and momentums, these are not completely determined by pre-
existing conditions. Ross regards the second meaning as nonsensical, for 
nothing, he argues, can have a position which is not a definite position 
or a momentum which is not a definite momentum. Ross further rejects the 
third interpretation in favor of the first. The present failure of science 
to know why atoms sometimes behave in one way and sometimes in another is 
not a sufficient reason, thinks Ross, to justify an indeterministic inter-
pretation. The inability to determine the exact position and momentum of 
an electron need not be due to the fact that the law of causality is not 
fulfilled, but that observations are not at the present delicate or accurate 
enough to put the law of causality to a direct test in each case.9 Says Ross, 
We must regard the principle of indeterminacy as one of the crude 
theories which are apt to be put forward in the years immediately 
after the discovery of some startling experimental10act, before the true meaning of the fact has been really digested. 
Though an unrepentant determinist regarding the physical universe, 
is Ross a determinist as regards the universe of moral action? He is. Ross 
admits that the ! posteriori verification of the law of causality is far 
less complete in the moral universe than it is in the physical universe. 
But the important question for him is whether we do or do not have a 
priori knowledge of the law of causality and of its application to moral 
action. For Ross, 
The strength of the a priori argument for determinism in ethics rests 
on the consideration-that the law of causality does not present itself 
to our minds as one peculiar to physical events but as one applying 
to all events as such.ll 
The indeterminist holds that the law of causation applies in the case of 
9see Ross, ££• cit., PP• 214-21. 
llrbid., p. 222. 
lOibid., p. 219. 
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all physical events and of most mental events but that there is one special 
class of mental events to which it does not apply. Acts where choice is 
involved are believed to escape the law of causation. Ross thinks that 
there might be some plausibility in making the law of causation apply to 
all physical and to no mental events. However, he thinks it highly 
implausible that the law or causation applies to all physical and some 
mental, but not to other mental, events. With the former case it could be 
argued that libertarianism rests on an ontological ground upon which one 
could expect acts of choice to be free from the law of causation; but it 
could not be so argued in the latter case.l2 
ftle;,casft.:fortlibartarlanialll tes'bs~ou:..t.-6 tbings11 (l) the supposed 
intuition of freedom and (2) the thought that morality involves freedom. 
we shall consider, in order, Ross's views in regard to these beliefs. 
With regard to the supposed intuition of freedom Ross examines two 
cases in which choices are made. (a) He considers cases of choice in which 
the thought of duty does not occur. He concludes that, in such situations, 
we do not seem, on reflection, to be conscious either of a power of 
thinking what we please in the light of given evidence, or of a power 
of desiring what we ple,se independently of our opinions, or of a 
power of doing what we do not most desire to do. Nor, if we had any 
of these powers, would it be or the slightest value. What would be 
the moral value of a power or forming opinions not based on the 
evidence, of desiring not in accordance with our opinion, or of 
acting to get what we do not desire.l3 
(b) But there are situations in which choices are made where the 
thought of duty does :noccur(:ur. Do individuals, in these cases, sometimes 
choose to do their duty instead of what they desire? !o be sure, when an 
individual does a conscientious act, he says that he did it because it 
was his duty. But, thinks Ross, this is a highly elliptical answer. 
l2see ibid., PP• 222-23. 13Ibid., PP• 225-26. 
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• • • the fuller and truer answer would be, 'I did the act because I 
knew, or thought, it to be my duty, and because I was more powerfully 
impelled, or attracted, towards it as being my duty than I was towards 
an alternative act.•l4 
And what is the nature of the impulsion? For Ross, all impulsion is 
desire. And, if so, conscientious action falls under the same description 
as actions in which the thought of duty does not occur. Even if action 
follows upon the strongest desire, resolution {or choosing or deciding) 
is not made completely nugatory. There is a real difference between action 
which is preceded by deliberation and choice and action which is engaged 
in without deliberation and choice. The latter action is determined by the 
strength of isolated desires. However, in the former action, one's whole 
uni•arse of desires determines one's action, and not just the strongest 
single desire. All that an act is expected to involve in terms of conse-
quences is taken into account in the cases where action is preceded by 
deliberation and choice. But even so, we still choose to do that act to 
which our whole character tends most strongly. Acts of choice, then, are 
not exceptions to the rule that action follows upon the strongest desire. 
It is not true then, that, 
the circumstances being what they are, and I being what I am, with 
that whole system of beliefs, desires, and dispositions which compose 
my nature, it is objectively possible for me here and now to do either 
of two or more acts. This is not possible, because whatever act I do, 
it must be because there is in me1~as I am now, a stronger impulse to do that act than to do any other. ~ 
However, in our unphilosophical moments we tend to believe that we 
can here and now, being what we are, do either of two or more acts. It is 
to an attempted explanation ofttiis phenomenon that Ross must now address 
himself. Ross considers as one main source of our sense of freedom to act 
in either of two ways the belief that our souls or minds have the kind 
lSibid., P• 230. See also PP• 226-30. 
76 
and degree of control over our bodies which enables us, by mentally 
setting ourselves to do something, to bring about movements in our 
bodies. Further, there is usually always more than one bodily change in 
any particular set of circumstances which the mind can produce if it sets 
itself to do so. Needless to say, the mind's power of controlling the body 
has great importance for the moral life. However, the question whether the 
mind can control the body is irrelevant to the question of the freedom of 
the will. What the libert~ian wants to maintain is not that acts of will 
effect bodily changes but that acts of will are not themselves caused by 
pre-existing conditions.l6 
Ross holds that this libertarian belief is not true. However, there 
is a sense in which we could set ourselves to produce either of two or 
more acts. There are alternative acts which present themselves to us which 
are all within the range of our known motives. But, due to our lack of 
complete knowledge of our nature and motives, we do not know which of our 
motives is the strongest. And not knowing which is the stronger, the 
reasonable thing to believe is that we are capable of doing either of the 
two acts. What we are meaning when we say that it is possible that we may 
do one or another act is that there are no existing conditions known to us 
with which our doing of either act is incompatible. 
'I can do this' means 'I have such a nature that if I want to perform 
the activity of setting myself to do this, I shall perform it'; and 
'I can refrain from doing this' means 1I have such a nature that if 
I want to retrain from doing this, I shall refrain from doing it•. Or, 
putting it briefly, 'I can do this or that• means 'I shall do this if 
I want, and I shall do that if I want• -- •want• being here a brachylogy 
for •want predominantly•.l7 
Setting ourselves to bring about a certain action necessarily follows 
upon a predominant wish. The claim 'I can do this or that• involves the 
16see ~·~ PP• 231-34. 
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assertion of the determined sequence of action on desire. It says 
nothing about the origin of desire; it certainly does not claim that 
desire is originated by an act of free choice. When one claims 'I can do 
this or that' he is often also claiming that his action depends entirely 
upon himself. This is in a sense true in that our actions are not dependent 
upon immediately precediag external conditions. Actions !!! immediately 
dependent upon the general capacity of setting ourselves to effect changes 
and the wish to effect one or another change, both being conditions in 
our mind. However, they are still determined actions.lB 
Ross maintains that there are some arguments drawn from the moral 
consciousness that tell in favor of determinism. These are (1) the reliance 
we have on the characters of other people; (2) the importance for good or 
evil which we attach to the formation of habits; (3) our surprized reaction 
to people's unexpected behavior; and (4) the judgments we make about the 
characters of other people, drawing inferences from people's actions to 
their characters. Ross holds that these convictions are not compatible with 
the libertarian view that one may at any moment make a choice independent 
of his whole pre-existing character, that is, that the will stands apart 
from the formed character.l9 
Summing up his position on the supposed intuition of freedom, 
Ross says, 
• • • we must find the uniqueness of aoral behaviour not in freedom 
from the general law of causation, but in the unique character of the 
activities which constitute such behaviour -- the activity of choosing 
or deciding, and the activity of setting oneself to do what one has 
decided to do, to which there is no analogy in the behaviour of any 
physical thing; and in the further fact; to which there is nothing 
analogous in the behaviour of a mere animal, that one of the thoughts 
lBsee ~., PP• 234-43. 
19see ~., PP• 243-46. 
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under whose influence one can choose and set oneself to act is the 
thought of an action as right.20 
The case for libertarianism rests not only on the supoosed intuition 
of freedom but also upon the thought that morality involves freedom. The 
argument is to the effect that, unless we are really free to do either of 
two or more different acts, the thought of responsibility for our acts 
(involved in the facts of remorse, blame, and punishment) is unjustifiable 
and unintelligible. The question Ross must face is whether a belief in 
individual responsibility is compatible with determinism. One approach Ross 
could take is that of denying individual responsibility as an illusion. 
But this road he does not take; he believes in individual responsibility. 
The only account that Ross, holding to determinism, can give of respon-
sibility is this: 
••• that bad acts can never be forced on anyone in spite of his 
character; that action is the joint product of character and circum-
stances and is always therefore to some extent evidence of character; 
that praise and blame are not (though they serve this purpose also) 
mere utilitarian devices for the promotion of virtue and the restraint 
of vice, but are the appropriate reactions to action which is good or 
is bad in its nature just as much if it is the necessar,y consequence 
of its antecedents as it would be if the libertarian account ware true; 
that in blaming bad actions we are also blaming and justifiably blaming 
the character from which they spring; and that in remorse we are being 
acutely aware that, whatever our outward circumstances may have been, 
we have ourselves been to blame for giving way to them where a person 
of better character would not have done so.21 
not This explanation doe~satisfy all that we naturally think about responsibility. 
But, thinks Ross, to claim more and hold that a moral agent can act 
independently of his character is to claim a metaphysical imoossibility.22 
20~., P• 246. 
21Ibid., PP• 250-51. 
22see ~., PP• 246-51. 
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B. Examination of Ross's Position 
It is important to notice that Ross uses a different method of 
approach to the problem of free-will from that which he uses in regard to 
other ethical questions that he considers. His method has been mainly 
the phenomenological one of examining the contents of the moral conscious-
ness. The phenomenological method is empirical in nature. However, with the 
problem of free-will, Ross takes an ! priori metaphysical approach. Ross 
despairs of the possibility of proving either determinism or indeterminism 
by ! posteriori proofs. If by an ! posteriori proof Ross means a highly 
probable hypothesis supported by inductive reasoning relying only on the 
evidence supplied by the physical sciences, one might have to agree with 
him. But is not evidence that is gained by introspection of one's moral 
consciousness empirical and thus ! posteriori? One would think so. However, 
Ross would deny that such evidence would constitute proof. Yet, since Ross 
has relied upon the evidence of the moral consciousness in other cases 
(in ascertaining what our duties are and what things are intrinsically 
good), one wonders why such evidence is to be questioned in this case. 
The case for libertarianism is not to be equated with the case for 
indeterminism. No libertarian would want to claim that free choices occur 
in ~· There are no doubt many things that account for one's making the 
particular decisions that he does make in moral situations. All the 
libertarian wants to claim is that there is nothing which forces or 
compels him (of a physical or psychological nature) to make the choices 
that he does make; in other words, the libertarian would maintain that in 
some moral situations he could have acted (by free choice) other than he 
did. Ross thinks it highly implausible that the law of causation might 
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apply to all physical and some mental, but not to other mental, events; 
the law of causality presents itself to our minds, olaims Ross, as one 
peculiar to all events as such. All we can say in reply to Ross on this 
point is that we can see nothing implausible about this libertarian claim; 
the law of causality does not present itself to our mind as being 
necessarily applicable to all those acts of choice which individuals make 
which are accompanied by a sense of duty. 
Besides the ! priori argument for determinism, there are three main 
points to Ross's case against libertarianism. (1) He maintains that all 
moral action follows upon or is impelled by one's strongest desire. 
Included here is conscientious action, action in which choices are made 
where the thought of duty occurs. In other words, we only do our duty when 
we are drawn toward it more powerfully than toward any other alternative. 
(2) Ross also argues that the conviction of the moral consciousness that 
character determines action is not compatible with the libertarian view 
that one may make a choice independent of his character. (3) Men are 
responsible for their actions, but only in the sense that they are partially 
responsible for their characters. 
Any replies which we shall make to the above claims must come from 
the moral consciousness, from actual moral experience and thinking. We 
know of no other way to meet the objections against free-will. 
If conscientious action actually always follows upon one's strongest 
desire, then we can see no way of refuting determinism. We can admit that 
there is much that is involved in a choice situation that is determined. 
E. F. Carritt thinks that the alternatives between which we choose are 
both determined.23 Our beliefs are determined by the facts that we attend 
23see E. F. Carritt, Ethical and Political Thinking (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1947), chapter 12. 
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to and by our understanding of these facts. Our desires are determined in 
other ways. However, Ross to the contrar,y, we do reach other than wishful 
conclusions. Our choice between beliefs and desires is free. We can give 
an intelligible account of a choice as distinguished from acting on desire. 
In the latter case, we might say, "I took it because I wanted to." In the 
former case we might say, "I left it because I thought I ought to." There 
is a phenomenological difference in the psychological feel of doing what 
we want and doing what we think we ought. In the sector of the field of 
choices in Which strongest desire clashes with duty, we often find ourselves 
doing our duty and crushing our strongest desire. 
The libertarian also believes that, for the most part, character 
determines action. However, he does not think that this necessarily entails 
that one may not at times make a choice independent of his character. 
It has been argued by determinists that if a person's choice does not 
. flow from his character, then it is not that person's choice at all, 
but just a chance happening. In Ross's terms, it is a metaphysical 
impossibility. However, we think that it can be defendably argued that a 
self may perform an act which is not an expression of the self's character. 
We must appeal to introspection. We must place ourselves imaginatively 
at the point where an agent is engaged in a moral sitution in which free-
will is claimed. Actually, what we are trying to understand in understanding 
free-will is creative activity, for the essential nature of creative activity 
is the transcending by a self of its character. We believe that intro-
spection discovers that we can rise to duty by an effort of will. There 
are choices which we make which we cannot doubt to be ~ than just the 
expression of our formed character; at the same time, we cannot doubt 
that the choice is ~ choice, a choice for which we can be justly praised 
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or blamed. We do have a kind of •subjective certainty' that we can freely 
choose against our strongest desire and, to a degree, independent of our 
character. But the meaning of this freedom is only discoverable "• • • in 
an intuition of the practical consciousness of the participating agent.n24 
But it is objected that the break in causal continuity which free-
will involves is inconsistent with the predictability of conduct on the 
basis of a personts known character. But we can grant that much of human 
conduct is predictable. Free-will doesn't operate in those practical 
situations in which there is no conflict between •duty' and •strongest 
desire•. If a man's desires and moral beliefs were determined, then the 
alternatives (if any) between which he could choose are in theor,y pre-
dictable; but we could never predict whether, on a given occasion, he 
would do what he thought to be his duty or what he more desired. Further, 
although we do develop habits which to an extent determine hew we will 
act in certain situations, it would seem to be impossible to form a habit 
of choosing rightly or wrongly. A just man is not always fair nor an ascetic 
always tolerant. To be sure, statistical averages are maintained under 
similar conditions (e. g., the number of suicides can be roughly predicted 
each year); we could know inthheory how many people each year will want 
to do X and how many will not want to • However, we do not know just which 
particular individuals will want or not want to do X. We would be unwarranted 
in inferring that the individual acts, which we cannot predict, are determined.25 
Men are responsible for their actions, both according to Ross and 
to the libertarians. But for Ross, they are only responsible in the sense 
24c. A. CalllPbell, "Is 'Free-Will' a Pseudo Problem?" ~' LX (1951), 
464. See also 461-64. 
25see ~., 46o-61. See also Garritt, op. ~., chapter 12. 
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that they are partially responsible fo~ their characters; bad acts cannot 
be forced on them in spite of their characters; when they do wrong, they 
can only blame themselves for giving way to outward circumstances when a 
person of better character would not have done so. However, if there is 
no free-will, how can we be responsible for our characters? Certainly, 
we had nothing (or very little) to do with the early formation of our 
must-consciences. We were conditioned by our parents, guardians, and early 
teachers to desire certain things. If we happened to be conditioned to 
desire wrong things, and if choice always follows upon desire, how could 
we be blamed for doing the wrong thingj? 
There are two alternatives open to Ross. (1) He could reject 
determinism in favor of free-will. This he does not want to do. (2) Or 
he could maintain that the individual soul.or mind, as soon as it enters 
this world {or is created or is conceived), has certain tendencies or 
latent desires toward the right and the good, which tendencies cannot be 
thwarted except as the individual allows himself to be influenced by bad 
opinions. However, to take this alternative is only to push the problem 
a step further back. For an individual will not allow himself to be 
influenced by bad opinions unless he so desires to be influenced by bad 
opinions more so than by good opinions. Whence the strongest desire in 
this direction? Either individual souls are created free to choose between 
good and evil or individual souls are created differently, some to desire 
evil, some to desire good, and some to desire different degrees of both 
good and evil. In the latter case, we have characters which have been 
determined from the beginning. And, if so, we have no individual responsi-
bility. 
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Without the admission of free-will, we do not see how one can speak 
of individual responsibility. Without free-will individuals could not be 
even partially responsible for their characters. But we are responsible 
for our characters; if introspection tells us anything, it tells us this. 
Therefore, we must have free-will. Further, when we do wrong, we do not 
blame ourselves for giving way to circumstances that a person of better 
ch~racter would not have given way to. We blame ourselves because we know 
that we could have·acted differently in the situation. 
It was noted at the beginning of this chapter that Ross does not 
think that he has adequately solved the problem of free-will vs. determinism. 
In this regard Ross says, 
It seems to me that something like half of our ordinary thinking on 
moral questions imolies a belief in the indetermination of the will, 
and something like half a belief in its determination; and I have 
neither found elsewhere nor discovere~6by my own reflections any adequate solution of this difficulty. 
Although Ross is well aware of the difficulties for ethical thinking 
involved in maintaining a strict determinism, he continues to hold that 
determinism reigns in the area of moral choices and actions. We have 
suggested that only the existence of contra-causal freedom (at least in 
those moral situations where choice to do one's duty goes against strongest 
desire) can adequately account for (1) the intuition of freedom reported 
by the moral consciousness and (2) the idea of moral responsibility. 
26aoss, Foundatio~, p. 328. 
VI. 
SUMMARY 
Ross takes as his basic method of approach to the study of ethics 
the phenomenological study or the moral consciousness. Just exactly what 
Ross means by the moral consciousness is difficult to determine, for the 
term seems to be used ambiguously in Ross's writing. Ross could be taken 
to mean by the moral consciousness either (1) the moral thinking of most 
men or (2) the moral thinking of the "best" or "thoughtful" or "well-educated" 
people or (3) the moral thinking ofW. D. Ross. 
Ross's confidence in the reports of the moral consciousness and his 
seeming indifference to the actual source of these reports rests (partially, 
at least) upon his beliefs (l)~t~~ there is a common moral consciousness 
of the entire human family; (2) that obligations and values are objective; 
and (3) that the human family is steadily progressing toward discovery of 
and agreement upon these objective obligations and values. The truth of this 
third belief is·most important for justifying Ross's appeal to the moral 
consciousness. For if it can be established that human moral progress 
(in the above sense) has reached or has approached close to the zenith of 
its development, then the appeal to the moral consciousness is justified. 
However, the many existing ethical disagreements between individuals, 
nations, and races argues strongly against the establishment of this view. 
Thus, in any appeal to the moral consciousness (which must in the nature 
of the case be an appeal to less than all men) there is an element of 
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arbitrariness. The arbitrary element is that of determining which 
individuals have progressed the most toward the discovery of the objective 
obligations and values. 
However, Ross himself holds that, in the final analysis, one must 
use his own judgment as to what is right and wrong, good and bad. The 
ultimate approach of Ross thus seems to become the critical study of his 
ow.n (and of others like him in background and temperament) moral conscious-
ness. ~bence Ross's confidence in the true reporting of his own deepest 
ethical convictions? 
The main support of this confidence is Ross's belief that we have 
intuitive insight into the rightness or wrongness of those acts which fall 
under the basic principles of morality (the principles that set forth the 
prima facie duties, e. g., promise-keeping, reparation, and gratitude). 
This intuitive insight (or direct insight or direct reflection) gives 
certain knowledge of these basic principles. Our judgments about our actual 
duties in concrete situations and our moral truths apprehended by deduction 
from general principles which have been accepted on authority or which 
are not self-evident carry none of this certainty. 
It would seem that Ross's intuitionism as a tqeory of the certain 
knowledge of the prima facie rightness or wrongness of certain kinds of 
acts is not vulnerable to refUtation. Certainly the objections to Ross•s 
intuitionism on the grounds that Ross complicates epistemology (by admitting 
an intuitive function of the mind) and that he admits too many intuitions 
cannot refute his position. All a critic of Ross's intuitionism as a theory 
of the knowledge of ethical truths can say is that he himself does not 
discern (or is not aware of) the quality of rightness when he considers 
certain cases that are supposedly instances of prima facie duties. He 
67 
cannot deny that Ross discerns this quality (or the quality of goodness) 
when he examines or reflects upon certain ethical situations. 
According to Ross, the main types of duty (fidelity, promise-keeping, 
reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-improvement, and non-
maleficence) do not rest upon any one principle (i. e., that every act that 
is our duty is so for one and the same reason, e. g., that it maximizes 
goodness). Ross is a formalist, maintaining that one's moral obligations 
(in some cases) are dependent on other things instead of the intrinsic 
value of the results of one•s acts. However, there are important teleological 
elements in Ross•s ethical theory. The general prima facie obligation to 
bring into existence things that are intrinsically good includes the prima 
facie duties of benevolence, self-improvement, justice, and non-maleficence. 
However, Ross maintains, the special obligations of reparation, gratitude, 
and promise-keeping are not reducible to the general obligation to produce 
as much good as possible (or to any teleological principle). 
For Ross, no general rules can be laid down for estimating the 
comparative stringency of prima ~ duties. Thus, he admits an ultimate 
variety of such duties. The teleologist (who is other than a hedonist) 
admits an ultimate varie~y of intrinsic goods; general rules for estimat-
ing the comparative strength of ultimate goods do not seem to be available. 
Yet the deontologist has doubled the pluralism of the utilitarian by holding 
that there is no common nature in what is right as well as in what is good. 
Ross thinks that appeal to the moral consciousness (to our own deepest 
ethical convictions) vindicates the plurality of prima facie duties; we 
keep promises, for example, because we think that we ought to keep promises, 
not because we give thought to their total consequences. 
A great part of our duty according to Ross is to bring what is good 
into existence. ¥\here no other special duty is involved, our general duty 
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is to produce as much good as we can. Things good in themselves are 
(1) virtuous disposition and action, (2) knowledge and right opinion, 
(3) the apportionment of pleasure and pain to the virtuous and vicious 
respectively, and (4) pleasure. Other things considered to be intrinsically 
good are combinations of two or more of the three simple goods -- virtue, 
knowledge 1 and pleasure. 
Virtue (moral goodness) is to be valued higher than both knowledge 
and pleasure. Knowledge ranks higher than pleasure. Since moral goodness 
is to be valued higher than all other goods, it is that which we are 
obligated to bring into existence above all else (except in a conflicting 
situation where a special obligation is considered to be more binding). 
The morally good character best worth aiming at in oneself and best worth 
trying to promote in others is the character which is disposed to act from 
a sense of duty plus all other relevant good desires (e. g., the desire to 
promote the moral and intellectual improvement of oneself and others); such 
a character would be that of an ideally good man. According to Ross, goodness 
of character is the only condition that with even the slightest degree of 
probability tends to make for the doing of right acts. 
Right acts are obligatory acts. Moral obligation entails moral 
responsibility. The question arises in Ross's ethical theory whether the 
idea of moral responsibility and the intuition of freedom reported by the 
moral consciousness can be adequately accounted for on a strict deterministic 
view of the universe. Ross thinks that they can be so accounted for but also 
thinks that he has not adequately accounted for·them. 
Ross accounts for the idea of moral responsibility in terms of partial 
responsibility for character. He accounts for the intuition of freedom in 
terms of one's belief, due to lack of complete knowledge of his nature and 
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motives, that he could, if he set h~elf to do so, here and now do 
either of two or more acts. This account denies the truth of the intuition 
of freedom. According to Ross, to claim that a moral agent can act independent• 
ly of his character (and thus freely) is to claim a metaphysical impossi-
bility. All action, for Ross, including conscientious action, follows 
upon one's strongest desire. 
However, there is a phenomenological difference in the psychological 
feel of doing what we want and doing what we think we ought. We believe 
that there are choice-situations in which strongest desire clashes with 
duty; and often, in these situations, we find ourselves doing our duty 
and crushing our strongest desire. Further, there are choices which we 
make which are our choices but which we cannot doubt to be ~ than just 
the expression of our formed character. Finally, without the admission 
of free-will it is difficult to see how one can adequately account for 
moral responsibility in the sense in which such responsibility is usually 
understood. It would seem, then, that only the existence of contra-causal 
freedom can adequately account for the intuition of freedom and the idea 
of moral responsibility. 
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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to examine in detail main problems that 
are encountered in w. D. Ross's ethical theory. The major sources of informa-
tion for Ross's ethical theory are the two volumes, The Right and the Good 
and Foundations of Ethics. Problems in Ross's ethical theory that are 
considered are the following: (1) methodology, (2) critical ethics, 
(3) normative ethics, and (4) free-will vs. determinism. 
Ross's basic approach to the study of ethics is the phenomenological 
approach in terms of the content of the moral consciousness. By moral 
consciousness Ross means the existence of a large body of beliefs and con-
victions (common to all men) to the effect that there are certain acts that 
ought to be done and certain things that ought. to be brought into existence. 
Ross, however, also relies heavily upon the moral consciousness of the 
"thoughtful" and "well-educated" and "best" people. Further, at other times 
he appeals to his own deepest ethical convictions. 
Ross's confidence in the reports of the moral consciousness and his 
seeming indifference to the actual source of these reports partially rests 
upon his beliefs (1) that there is a common moral consciousness of the entire 
human family; (2) that obligations and values are objective; and (3) that the 
human family is steadily progressing toward discovery of and agreement upon 
these objective obligations and values. It seems questionable, however, 
whether this third contention is true. The many existing ethical disagreements 
between individuals, nations, and races argue,· strongly against its establishment. 
Ross himself holds that, in the final analysis, one must use his own 
judgment as to what is right and wrong, good and bad. His ultim~te approach 
thus becomes the critical study of his own (and of others• like him in back-
ground and temperament) moral consciousness. 
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The main support of Ross's confidence in the true reporting of his 
own moral consciousness is his belief that one has intuitive knowledge 
(certain knowledge gained by direct insight or direct reflection) of the 
rightness pr wrongness of those acts which fall under the basic principles 
of morality. According to Ross, one has intuitive knowledge of both rightness 
and goodness, which are indefinable, irreducible concepts or notions. Ross's 
theory of the meaning and justification of ethical concepts, which constitutes 
his critical ethics, is to be classified as rational intuitionism or nonnatural-
ism. 
The objections to Ross's intuitionism on the grounds that Ross compli-
cates epistemology (by admitting an intuitive function of the mind) and that 
he admits too many intuitions cannot refute his position. A critic, for ex-
ample, may say that he himself does not discern (or is not aware of) the 
quality of rightness when he considers certain cases that are supposedly 
instances of duties (or obligations). However, he cannot deny that Ross discerns 
this quality (or the quality of goodness) when he (Ross) examines or reflects 
upon certain ethical situations. 
In terms of normative etr~cs Ross is a formalist. Tel~ologists hold in 
common the view that one's moral obligations depend entirely on the intrinsic 
worth of the actual or expected results of the acts which one might perform. 
Formalists, claiming that this thesis is too iiaple, hold in common the view 
that one's moral obligations are dependent on other things in addition to 
(or instead of) the intrinsic value of the results of one's acts. 
Normative ethical theories attempt to determine what things are right 
and good. Ross's theor,y of duties constitutes his study of what acts are right 
(or wrong). The main types of duty, for Ross, are those of fidelity, promise-
keeping, reparation, gratitude, justice, beneficence, self-imnrovement, and 
non-maleficence. An important distinction is made by Ross between prima facie 
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duties and actual duties. A prima ~ duty is the characteristic or ten-
dency which an act has to be one's duty in virtue of some one component of 
its nature. An actual duty (or duty proper) is the characteristic an act has 
of being one's duty in virtue of its whole nature. An act may have tendencies 
that call forth more than one prima facie duty or conflicting prima facie 
duties. However, an act calls forth only one actual duty, which is that act 
which one believes has the greatest claim upon him at the moment. 
Although Ross's theory is formalistic, it does contain important teleo-
logical elements. The general prima facie obligation to bring into existence 
things that are intrinsically good includes the prima facie duties of benevo-
lence, self-improvement, justice, and non-maleficence. 
Since Ross maintains (1) that the special obligations of reoaration, 
gratitude, and promise-keeping are not reducible to the general obligation 
to produce as much good as possible and (2) that no general rules can be laid 
down for estimating the comparative stringency of prima facie duties, he must 
admit an ultimate variety of duties. Thus, he doubles the pluralism of the 
teleologist by holding that there is no common nature in those things which 
are right as well as in those things which are good (The teleologist admits 
an ultimate variety of intrinsic goods.). 
The other aspect of Ross's normative ethics is his theory of the good. 
For Ross, things good in themselves (intrinsically good or good apart from 
their results) are (1) virtuous disposition and action, (2) knowledge and 
right opinion, (3) the apportionment of pleasure and pain to the virtuous and 
vicious respectively, and (4) pleasure. Other things considered to be intrin-
sically good are combinations of two or more or the three simple goods - -
virtue, knowledge, and pleasure. 
Virtue (moral goodness) is to be valued higher than both knowledge and 
pleasure. Knowledge ranks higher than pleasure. Since moral goodness is to be 
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valued higher than both knowledge and pleasure. Moral goodness is that which 
we are obligated to bring into existence above all else (except in a con-
flicting situation where a special onligation is considered to be more bind-
ing). The morally good character which is to be valued highest is the character 
which is disposed to act from a sense of duty plus all other relevant good 
desires; such a character would be that of an ideally good man. Ross holds that 
goodness of character is the only condition that with even the slightest degree 
of probability tends to make for the doing of right acts. 
The final problem considered in Ross's ethical theory is that of free-
will vs. determinism. Ross is a strict determinist, holding that the law of 
causation (defined in terms of necessity or efficiency) apnlies to both the 
physical universe and the universe of moral action. The question arises as to 
whether the idea of moral resoonsibility and the intuition of freedom reported 
by the moral consciousness can be adequately accounted for on such a strict 
deterministic view of the universe. 
Ross accounts for the idea of moral responsibility in terms of partial 
responsibility for character. He accounts for the intuition of freedom in 
terms of one's belief, due to lack of complete knowledge of his nature and 
motives, that he could, if he set himself to do so, hare and now do either of 
two or more acts. All action, for Ross, including conscientious action, follows 
upon one's strongest desire. Nor can a moral agent act independently of his 
character. 
However, there is a phenomenological difference in the psychological 
feel of doing what one wants and doing what one thinks he ought. Also, one 
aftsn crushes his strongest desire and does his duty in those choice-situations 
where desire and duty conflict. Further, one does make some choices which are 
his choices but which he cannot doubt to be ~ than just the expression of 
his formed character. Finally, without the admission of free-will it is 
" 
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difficult to see how one can adequately account for moral responsibility. 
Only the existence of contra-causal freedom can adequately account for the 
intuition of freedom and tne idea of moral responsibility. 
